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History
A Revisionist Analysis of Edmund B u r k e ’s 
Political Ideology (1
Director: Linda Frey
Edmund Burke's political ideology is examined within its 
historical context. Many studies of Burke have either- 
ignored or mistaken the historical context. Thus the 
richness of his political philosophy has been missed. This 
study supplies a historical context, relying primarily on 
work done in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
historiography by J. G. A. P o c o c k . Both Burke's
traditionalism and his Whiggism are examined.
Burke's traditionalism owed much to the common-law habit 
of thinking prevalent in England. The common law was based 
on custom. Burke revived the adaptive sense of custom. He 
used this way of thinking to defend present arrangements 
against both nostalgic desires to return to an idealized 
past and innovative schemes of reform.
Burke was also a Whig, and the Whig aristocratic regime 
promoted a progressive. dynamic, commercial society. Thus 
Burke's traditionalism must be reconciled with his Whiggism.
Eighteenth-century debates were framed within a civic 
humanist language that appealed to ideas of mixed 
government. classical citizenship, and virtue. This 
language was used both to attack and to defend commercial 
society. The French Revolution presented a challenge to the 
aristocratic Whig defense of commerce. It seemed to offer a 
choice between aristocratic government and commercial 
society. Burke changed the Whig defense so that it might 
continue to defend both aristocracy and commerce. He argued 
that.liberal, commercial relations that provided for diverse 
individual wants depended on culture, rather than the other 
way round as most eighteenth-century thinkers believed. 
Culture in turn depended upon the presence or absence of 
religious and aristocratic institutions. Without these 
institutions, commerce might exist, but it would serve the 
state rather than the individual. The choice was not 
between aristocracy or commerce. but between liberal or 
totalitarian commerce. Liberal commercial relations
required the presence of a clergy .and a nobility. Thus 
Burke linked his traditionalist respect for existing 
institutions with his Whiggish admiration of commerce.
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INTRODUCTION
Edmund Burke's political career coincided roughly with 
the reign of King George III, the villain of the American 
Declaration of Independence. This period included momentous 
events that still have effect, and Burke expressed opinions 
on many of them. He was directly involved in the major 
reform movements of his time, and he created a rich ideology 
of and attitude towards change. He formulated the first 
defense of party, till then considered disreputable. He 
helped to develop the ethical and practical principles 
involved in the administration of empire and concerned 
himself for decades with the affairs of America, Ireland, 
and India. He fought for minorities, but he opposed 
extremists, and he became the first and most eloquent critic 
of the French Revolution. He was brilliant, profound, and 
wise. He was also passionate and even sufficiently flawed 
to remind posterity that he was human rather than oracular. 
His insights may possess value for modern times, but 
understanding of his ideas on their own terms, in their own 
context, cannot hurt and may enhance that value. An 
historical analysis of Burke need not denigrate Burkean 
theory. To explain an interest or to provide a context is 
not the same thing as the reduction of explanation to 
interest or circumstance. Historical analysis may be used
1
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that way. It can equally be used to enrich theory and even 
to provide additional ground for admiration of the theorist.
Burke's political ideology originated in and had an 
effect upon the political languages available to eighteenth- 
century thinkers. Burke's traditionalism owed much to the 
common-law habit of thinking prevalent among English lawyers 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The common law 
was based on custom. Burke revived the adaptive sense of 
custom. He used this way of thinking to defend present 
arrangements against both nostalgic desires to return to an 
idealized past and innovative schemes of reform.
But Burke was not simply a traditionalist. He defended 
the Whig aristocratic regime which promoted a progressive, 
dynamic, commercial society. In the eighteenth century, 
commercial society was both defended and attacked through 
appeals to classical civic humanist values. Burke, as a 
Whig, engaged in this debate and defended commerce according 
to the available civic humanist assumptions. The French 
Revolution, however, seemed to challenge the aristocratic 
Whig defense of commerce and to present, instead, a choice 
between aristocracy and commerce. Burke enlisted his 
traditionalist respect for existing institutions and altered 
Whig assumptions so that the Whigs might continue to support 
both aristocracy and commerce. Thus Burke did not develop 
his political philosophy as a response to and rejection of a 
rising bourgeois culture. Burke supported that culture and
used his traditionalist conservatism in its defense.
The following chapters will supply the context for 
Burke's ideology, for the "constellation of ideas" that he 
employed to give meaning to the events that made up his 
life.1 Chapter 1 provides the first layer of context, a 
biographical sketch of Burke's life. It summarizes Burke' 
major works and places them in both a personal and a 
national context. The second chapter describes three 
representative interpretations of Burke and locates their 
essential flaws in their various failures to consider the 
historical context adequately. The third and fourth 
chapters present the ideological context. They describe, 
generally, the ideas available to the people of the 
eighteenth century to understand their world and, 
specifically, B u r k e ’s understanding and use of, as well as 
his effect upon, that ideological universe.
CHAPTER 1 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Some basic biographical facts about Edmund Burke 
constitute a first layer of context for understanding 
Burke's political ideology. This chapter provides a 
biographical sketch of Burke's life and summarizes many of 
his more significant works.
Edmund Burke was born in Dublin, Ireland in 1729. His 
parents raised their son as an Anglican, yet the Catholic 
influence in young Edmund's life was so pervasive that he 
developed a lasting sympathy and affection for that ancient 
religion. Not only were Burke's mother and sister Catholic, 
but in addition to this exposure, Burke lived with Catholic 
relatives from age six to eleven, he attended Catholic 
schools, and he developed close friendships with Catholic 
boys. Ultimately, he would fall in love with, then marry, a 
Catholic girl. Burke remained faithful to the Anglican 
religion of his upbringing, but he would never understand or 
pander to the strong anti-Catholic prejudices prevalent in 
England.
Burke's father wanted his bright son to become a 
lawyer. Thus, at the age of 21, Burke began five years of 
study for the bar at Middle Temple in London. During these 
years. Burke met his future wife, Jane Nugent, and began his
4
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close, lifelong friendship with Will Burke.4 He also 
discovered that he had no taste whatsoever for the law. 
Contrary to his father's wishes, Burke decided that he would 
pursue a literary career.
A Notebook of Edmund Burke contained some of his 
earliest writings.3 Burke presumably wrote most of these 
character sketches and essays while he studied for the bar 
at Middle Temple. Burke already displayed in these youthful 
musings a skeptical awareness of the limitations of reason. 
Reason could not yield either religion or the polite arts, 
morality or habits, custom, and ceremony. Men needed, 
instead, to rely on "all the Powers of our Soul."^ Reason 
had its uses; it checked passions and imagination. But it 
could not inspire. It did not account for behavior. It 
could not create an elegant or humane disposition of mind.
It was insufficient to motivate virtue or to produce 
contentment.
In 1756, Burke responded to the recent posthumous 
publication of Lord Bolingbroke's collected works by 
publishing his first work, A Vindication of Natural 
Society .̂ Burke's Vindication, a parody of Bol ingbroke ' s 
style, attacked Bolingbroke's Deism by connecting civil 
society and religion. Bolingbroke had argued for a 
"natural" religion, one based on the private judgment of 
individuals. But, Burke maintained, the unrestrained 
reason, neglectful of both its own limitations and the
consequences of its criticisms, might attack anything. The 
same arguments employed against organized religion might as 
successfully be used against organized society. Just as an 
intricate social and political order kept men from anarchy, 
Burke implied, an established church prevented an anarchy of 
spirit and morals.** Thus, as early as 1756, Burke rejected 
appeals to nature and reason.7
The next year, Burke married Jane Nugent, published a
critically-acclaimed book on aesthetics, A Philosophical
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the
Beautiful, and contracted to write An Abridgement of English
History. The Abridgement, though never finished and not
published until after Burke's death, contained an essay that
revealed much about Burke's knowledge of and attitude
towards the law and the historical changes it had 
0undergone. In this essay, written around 1759, Burke 
demonstrated that he knew of the controversy between the 
partisans of the ancient constitution and those of the 
feudal law. The advocates of an immemorial ancient 
constitution blindly and contradictorily refused to admit 
historical beginnings for liberty and rights or the 
institutions that protected them. Advocates of prerogative, 
however, used feudal history simply to assert that rights 
derived from a sovereign will. Burke admitted the impact on 
English laws and institutions of the Norman conquest and 
denied that the rude and simple ancient constitution was
either desirable or practical for present use. Still, there 
was more to law than will. The laws had improved over time. 
They were a mixed and heterogeneous mass— borrowed, 
compounded, altered, and modified. Burke advocated the 
compilation of a history of the law that would follow its 
various changes and improvements over time. Only Lord Chief 
Justice Hale had attempted a history of the law, and his 
contribution was seriously flawed. Hale, and English 
lawyers generally, maintained that English law had remained 
virtually unchanged from antiquity and that it reflected 
only local, uniquely English adaptations. Thus Hale's 
history had been narrowly confined. Hale considered any 
search for beginnings, changes, or foreign influences 
superfluous. Burke, however, disagreed with Hale's 
dismissal of historical inquiry. Burke argued that a 
history of the law would reveal the progress of justice and 
the evolution of God's plan for man.
In 1759, Burke, by now a father to a year-old son, 
Richard, contracted to edit the Annual Register, a review of 
the preceding year's political, literary, social, and 
artistic events.^ More significantly, Burke's literary 
talent, by now widely acknowledged in educated circles, 
brought him attention from politicians. Thus, that same 
year, William Gerard Hamilton, Member of Parliament for 
Pontefract and Irish Chief Secretary to Lord Halifax, Lord 
Lieutenant for Ireland., hired Burke as his private
8
secretary.*® Though Burke would part with Hamilton on 
unfriendly terms five years later, he tasted political life, 
and made important political contacts as Hamilton's 
secretary. His political career had begun.11
By 1764, Burke had become associated with the coterie 
of Whigs that gathered around the Second Marquis of 
Rockingham, Charles Watson Wentworth. Other Whig factions 
existed besides the Rockinghamites. Powerful individuals 
such as William Pitt and Prime Minister Grenville also 
commanded factions. However, most factions developed out of 
personal attachment to a particular leader or from desire
i nfor office. In fact, people of the time generally agreed 
that any party connection was unsavory and corrupt, 
subversive of the public interest, and proof of an 
individual's selfish pursuit of private ambition. The 
Rockinghamites, however, claimed that principle drew them 
together. Essentially, they opposed the perceived extension 
of crown influence since George Ill's accession to the crown 
in 1760. They grouped together, they claimed, so as to 
maintain a steadiness and strength in their opposition. 
Still, party connection remained suspect, without an 
adequate rationalized defense.
In 1765, Parliament divided over the question of taxing 
the American colonies. Parliament passed the Stamp Act that 
year, and the American colonies objected strenuously to this 
tax. Previously, Parliament had taxed the colonies only in
connection with the regulation of trade. The Stamp Act, 
however, was intended solely for the purpose of raising 
revenue. The colonists saw in this Parliamentary innovation 
an infringement on their assumed right to manage their own 
internal affairs. Several boycotts engineered by the 
colonists upset British trade, and British merchants 
agitated for the Stamp Act's repeal. The ministry, under 
Grenville, took a hard line and insisted that Parliament was 
sovereign, the supreme governing authority. That body 
possessed, therefore, the authority to pass any legislation 
regarding the colonies that it wished. William Pitt, in 
entire agreement with the colonists, denied that Parliament 
could institute a new tax. Parliament could not tax 
unrepresented subjects, and the Americans were not 
represented in Parliament. The Rockinghamites, and Burke 
with them, took the middle ground. They upheld 
Parliamentary sovereignty against Pitt, but they argued 
against Grenville that, as a matter of expediency.
Parliament should repeal the Stamp Act.
In July 1765, George III dismissed the Grenville 
ministry and reluctantly invited the Marquis of Rockingham 
to form a government. Burke became Rockingham's private 
secretary (and, incidentally, a Member of Parliament for the 
borough of Wendover in Buckinghamshire owned by Lord 
Verney). The Rockinghamites succeeded in getting the Stamp 
Act repealed. They also pushed through the Declaratory Act
10
which maintained Parliament's right to tax the colonies. 
Within months, however, the king dismissed the Rockingham 
ministry. Pitt succeeded to the ministry, and Burke and his 
friends once again went into opposition. From this vantage 
point, Burke developed a defense of party connection.
Within four years, he would become the pioneer defender and 
architect of the modern political system.
In 1769, Burke published his first political pamphlet,
iqa reply to a 1768 Grenvillean pamphlet by William Knox.
Burke ridiculed the Grenville faction's analysis of the 
condition of England and supported the actions of the 
Rockingham ministry in 1765. Though this pamphlet ranged 
over a wide variety of subjects, its essential object was to 
defend the Rockingham party. In so doing, Burke anticipated 
ideas on party government and principled opposition that he 
would explore more fully the following year.14
By 1770, the tranquility and stability of Whig 
government seemed shattered. The American colonies were 
rebellious. Whig aristocrats resented George Ill's 
government, and popular discontent was widespread and 
growing. The group associated with Rockingham had joined in 
the expanding popular movement. When Middlesex county 
repeatedly elected the fiery John Wilkes as their 
representative in Commons, that House as often refused to 
seat him. Burke and the Rockinghamites objected to 
Parliament's action in this matter. A petition movement was
11
growing that condemned parliamentary corruption, ministerial
mismanagement, and the supposed growth of royal prerogative.
Burke helped to organize that movement, and the Rockingham
coterie supported it. Anonymous attacks on the government
and its Prime Minister Grafton in the "Letters of Junius"
expressed views similar enough to those held in Rockingham's
circle that many thought Burke penned the letters.1'* The
dilemma for the Rockinghamites, however, was that popular
discontent threatened aristocratic as well as crown
influence. These opposition Whigs could not completely
embrace the sentiments of their allies in the popular
movement, the London, country, and American radicals.16 As
Whig ideology had long been founded upon pragmatic
acceptance, the Rockingham Whigs easily assumed this
attitude in their formulation of a more compatible means of
opposition. Though parties were almost unanimously
condemned in the eighteenth century, the Rockinghamites now
insisted on their necessity as a defense against an emerging 
17Crown threat.
Burke espoused this theory of party government in 1770 
in Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents.16 
Burke located the cause of England's problems in political 
corruption proceeding from court influence. Growing court 
influence threatened the independence of Parliament and the 
security for the importance of the people by attacking the 
capacity of aristocrats in Parliament to form associations.
12
Connection, the association of men who shared common ideals, 
provided the only practical means of balancing the power of 
the Court. The Crown presented the danger. The peerage 
provided a protection against this danger. The Crown needed 
council from men already esteemed by, rather than unknown 
to, the people. An independent aristocracy provided this.
A ministry of courtiers, selected simply for their 
compatibility with the Crown, did not. The Wilkes affair 
demonstrated the extent to which the Commons had allied with 
the magistracy against the people. This alliance was 
contrary to the intended nature of Commons. Commons was 
supposed to guard the people's interest, not represent a 
separate interest against which the people needed 
protection. Reform of representation, the solution proposed 
by London and country radicals, only addressed the problem 
peripherally. The problem was not that the people were 
unequally represented, but rather that their representatives 
were not protected enough from court influence to be true 
representatives. The real contest was not between the 
electors and Commons, but between the electors and the 
Crown. Aristocratic connection provided a means of 
restoring Parliamentary independence. Then the Commons 
could resume its role of reflecting the interests of the 
people.
Burke knew of the objections to party association and 
attempted to answer them. Opponents of party claimed that
13
It was disloyal and that it encouraged the development of 
narrow, partisan self-interest. To these objections, Burke 
replied in characteristically Whig fashion. He chose an 
empirical argument to combat the assertion of disloyalty.
The government presently enjoyed strong support from 
Parliament, and yet it was weak. Government needed, the 
present situation demonstrated, not support, but reform. He 
chose a practical argument to counter the charge that party 
encouraged partisan self-interest. Burke admitted that men 
might pursue their selfish interests by means of party. 
However, he asserted, it was also possible for party to be
1 Q"the respectable instrument of honest men of principle."^ 
Narrow factionalism was not an essential characteristic of 
party association. However, without party association, 
whether one pursued his public duty or not, achievement of 
o n e ’s ends became impossible. A lone individual could never 
succeed against combined strength. The ministerial cabal 
could be successfully confronted only through the united 
strength of public-spirited men. "When bad men combine," 
Burke wrote, "the good must associate; else they will fall, 
one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible 
struggle."^0 With party, the potential of faction meant 
merely the possibility of subversion. Without party, the 
practical ineffectiveness of public servants meant the 
certainty of impotence.
In 1767, the Townshend Acts imposed six punitive duties
14
on the American colonies. When the North ministry assumed 
power in 1770, it repealed all these duties with the 
exception of the tax on tea. Then, in 1774, Parliament 
again debated American taxation when it considered the 
removal of the tea tax. Burke embellished his decade-old 
position regarding colonial taxation in his "Speech on 
American Taxation" of April 19, 1774.^ He advocated 
repeal of the tea duty on both prudential and practical 
grounds. Burke noted that the tea tax had had the effect of 
mischievously elevating the discussion between Britain and 
her colonies to claims regarding abstract rights. The 
British argued their sovereign right to tax, and the 
Americans countered with their right not to be taxed based 
on their natural rights to liberty and property. The 
discussion of abstractions, Burke believed, was neither 
necessary nor desirable. On the abstract level, authority 
and liberty could not be reconciled. At the practical 
level, they had been and might still be compatible. Burke 
thus recommended that the British disavow, altogether, 
taxing the colonies for the purpose of raising revenue. 
Revenue taxation not only created dissent but, since the 
Americans refused to pay such taxes, failed even to produce 
revenue. The British and the Americans had both prospered 
while the British had remained content simply to regulate 
colonial trade. Additionally, both past practice and 
ministerial promises had led the Americans to expect that
15
they would not be subjected to taxes for the purpose of 
raising revenue. The Americans defended custom; the British 
challenged it. Since Britain had nothing to lose and much 
to gain by repealing this final revenue tax, Burke counseled 
that Britain be satisfied, as in the past, with binding the 
colonies to her by means of mutual advantage through trade.
Largely because of his outspoken defense of the 
American colonists, Burke came to the attention of the 
merchants of the great port city of Bristol. They offered 
him a chance to run for election in Bristol, Burke seized 
the opportunity, and in November 1774, he was elected as 
Member of Parliament from Bristol. Upon his election, Burke 
explained to his constituents his understanding of the role 
and responsibilities of a legislator.^ Against the more 
radical claim that a representative was no more than the 
delegate of the electors sent to Parliament to execute their 
instructions, Burke insisted that a representative should 
act according to the dictates of his conscience. Naturally 
the wishes of his constituents had to be considered and 
their interests placed above his own. But a representative 
owed his constituents hard work and informed judgment rather 
than subservience. In the first place, issues could not be 
properly decided prior to deliberation and discussion. 
Secondly, Members of Parliament represented in that 
deliberative body, not hostile interests, but the good of 
the whole nation. Representatives were members of
16
Parliament, not members for their borough or town. Thus 
Burke rejected the right of voters to instruct their 
representative in Parliament.
Burke then turned his attention again to colonial 
affairs. He had never "favored" the American Revolution. 
Rather he sympathized with some of the colonists' complaints 
and thought that British tax legislation imprudently 
provoked them.22 Consequently, when Lord Chatham (William 
Pitt) offered a conciliatory plan in the House of Lords in 
February 1775, Burke and the Rockinghamites supported the 
plan. They hardly agreed with Chatham's rationale that 
Parliament had no authority to tax the colonies. The 
Rockinghamites simply believed that the exercise of 
Parliament's authority with regard to the colonies was 
inexpedient.
Burke argued for Chatham's plan on March 22, 1775 in 
his "Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with 
the Colonies."24 The colonies, Burke pointed out, were of 
undoubted value to the British Empire. Trade with the 
American colonies constituted one-third of the imperial 
trade; both Britain and the colonies had benefitted from 
that trade. British policy with regard to these important 
colonies should be based upon their actual circumstances, 
rather than upon some abstract right. The distinguishing 
characteristic of American colonials was their love of 
liberty. British policies, however, had seemed to threaten
17
colonial freedom and had served only to Inspire rebellion. 
The question Parliament must decide was the appropriate 
means of dealing with the American spirit of liberty. The 
best policy Parliament could adopt, Burke argued, was one of 
"systematic indulgence." Conciliation, not force, was 
Parliament’s best hope of binding the colonies to the 
Emp i r e .
By 1777, the Bristol merchants had begun to profit from 
the war with the colonies. They now began to disapprove of 
Burke's sympathy for the Americans. Thus Burke defended his 
opposition to the war with America in "A Letter to the 
Sheriffs of Bristol."2'* Burke objected to the war-like 
state of mind that existed in England. "Men of anger,"
Burke wrote, attacked those of moderate, conciliatory views 
as vehemently as they.railed against the Americans. But, 
Burke argued, moderation neither hurt the war effort nor 
encouraged colonial rebellion, and it was not disloyal. A 
conciliatory temper had to precede reconciliation; 
government could be strengthened by its instruments of peace 
as well as by those of war. Moderates simply refused to 
surrender their reason to their passions for loyalty 
mandated neither servility nor the suspension of reason. 
Freedom and authority were difficult to reconcile. However, 
Burke insisted, it was "not by deciding the suit, but by 
compromising the difference, that peace (could) be restored 
or kept."26 England's best hope lay in quieting the
18
disturbance. But, circumstances had changed; a simple 
repeal of the revenue tax would no longer suffice. Now, 
Burke claimed. Parliament had to grant the Americans their 
freedom in order to salvage any advantage from their 
relationship.
Burke's Bristol constituents objected as well to his
position on Ireland. As early as 1765, Burke had written
down, though he had not published, his objections to the
popery laws in Ireland.^ These laws punished Catholics
for their faith and fixed certain disabilities on Catholics
2ftwhich worked to exclude them from public office. 0 Burke 
defended religious conscience in Ireland and claimed that 
the popery laws were justified by neither equity nor 
utility. He argued that English severity rather than Irish 
zeal for Catholicism kept the Irish Catholics estranged from 
the British commonwealth. The Tracts gave an early 
indication of Burke's view on law and displayed his lifelong 
concern for Irish Catholics and his tendency to sympathize 
with persecuted people.
Burke continued to oppose British policy towards 
Ireland as a member from Bristol. In 1778, Burke voted to 
remove some restraints on Irish trade. This angered the 
Bristol merchants. Thus, on April 23 and May 2, 1778, Burke 
explained his vote in "Two Letters to Gentlemen in the City 
of Bristol."^ He denied that party design affected his 
vote. Instead, he insisted, he had considered the interests
19
of his constituents. Burke argued that Bristol's economic 
interests would be advanced, not hindered, by a prosperous 
Ireland. Burke admitted his desire for the approval of his 
constituents, but he insisted that he would not obtain their 
approval at the expense of his conscience.
As a member from Bristol, Burke authored one of the 
most comprehensive reform bills ever to pass through 
Parliament.00 His "economical reform" of 1780 promoted 
Parliamentary independence by curbing the Crown's ability to 
reward independent members of Parliament. He justified his 
reforms on February 11, 1780 in his "Speech on Economical
•31Reform. Burke admitted that sweeping reform made him
uneasy. But he insisted, his reforms were, on the one 
hand, necessary and timely and, on the other hand, 
essentially moderate. Protection of England's strength and 
preeminence in the world required that some checks be made 
on the rapidly accumulating public debt. Consequently, it 
was vital that improper royal expenditure be eliminated. 
Furthermore, the reforms were strictly limited. Burke 
certainly did not oppose all sinecures. Many, he argued, 
were necessary and honorable. Some rewarded merit; some 
were hereditary family possessions. Burke refused to tamper 
with such offices. He did not aim to democratize Parliament 
or to eliminate the system of patronage. 4 He proposed 
merely to reform some of the royal abuses of the present 
system. Thus he targeted only "improper" royal influence
20
and extravagance.
By 1780 Burke faced a contested election In Bristol.
He had angered his constituents on four counts: first, the
Bristol merchants disagreed with Burke's sympathy towards
the Americans; second, they believed that Burke had favored
Irish interests to those of Bristol in matters of trade;
third, they resented his sympathy towards Catholics; and
fourth, as merchants, they objected to his support of a bill
mitigating the severity of imprisonment for d e b t . Burke
responded to these objections in his "Speech at the
Guildhall" delivered in September 1 7 8 0 . First, Burke
directed the electors' attention to what he felt was their
true concern in judging a representative. A representative
would, he admitted, have faults and make errors. But, Burke
argued, "he censures God who quarrels with the imperfections 
ISof man. J Burke urged discretionary examination of a 
representative's performance. The electors should concern 
themselves with a representative's character, with the whole 
tenor of his conduct, rather than focusing on the inevitable 
mistake. And, in this respect, Burke had worked tirelessly 
and disinterestedly for his constituents. Then Burke 
addressed their concerns, attempting to demonstrate in each 
instance that he had advanced the interests of his Bristol 
constituents. He had acted against their opinions, to be 
sure, but only when these seemed to him to be at odds with 
their genuine interests. Burke still denied that
21
representatives were subject to instructions— "the little, 
silly canvass prattle of obeying instructions and having no 
opinions but yours. He had voted in good conscience.
He owed no apology, he defiantly insisted, for betraying his 
constituents. Despite or perhaps because of his defense at 
the Guildhall, Burke soon recognized that he would not be
07reelected from Bristol and withdrew from the contest. ' 
Rockingham then found him the safe, though obscure, seat at 
Malton. To the end of his career, Burke represented this 
pocket borough.
The North ministry, in power since 1770, finally fell 
in 1782. Rockingham succeeded North and appointed Burke as 
Paymaster. This post, though not a cabinet-level office, 
was nonetheless considered a profitable office. Paymasters 
could legally lend out the funds allocated for salaries and 
keep the interest from these loans. A member of the Bedford 
faction had made 500,000 pounds while he held this 
office. 0 And Burke certainly needed the money. He was 
heavily in debt from the purchase of a 600-acre estate at 
Beaconsfield in 1768. His brother Richard and "cousin"
Will, with whom Burke lived and shared expenses, had both 
been financially ruined by their investments in East India 
Company stock. But Burke, as Paymaster, abolished the 
privilege of lending out funds and instituted, instead, a 
generous, but predictable and controlled, annual salary of 
4,000 pounds.
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Reformers in England directed much of their energy 
towards the reform of England’s archaic system of 
representation. In 1782, William Pitt sponsored a bill that 
would increase both county and urban representation. Burke, 
who had supported measures aimed at curbing royal excesses, 
rejected these efforts. In a speech delivered on May 7,
qq1782, Burke refuted the various reform positions.
Burke identified two irreconcilable arguments for 
reform. The first argument, espoused by proponents of the 
individual rights of men, insisted that the House of Commons 
should be, but was not, representative of the people as a 
collection of autonomous individuals. Burke argued that 
this claim subverted the British constitution and its scheme 
of mixed government. On such a theory, neither the monarch 
nor the nobility possessed legitimacy. However, the 
constitution was not a product of choice as these reformers 
suggested. Instead, it was the product of time, of 
circumstances, of habits, and of tempers. Prescription, 
rather than individual rights, legitimized the constitution. 
Men were not autonomous but were, instead, bound to each 
other through their family, society, and tradition. The 
constitution linked generations; its wisdom evolved. 
Presumptive rather than abstract reason provided the surest 
guide for constitutional reform.
The second argument scorned personal representation.
The Commons, these reformers claimed, had degenerated from
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its original principles and thus could no longer adequately 
promote the good of the whole. Burke rejected this argument 
on two grounds. In the first place, he denied the existence 
of any original principles. The government had not been 
founded upon principles. Instead, its principles had been 
deduced from the operations of government. In the second 
place, appeals to the good of the community were, by 
definition, appeals to expediency. And the best test of 
expediency was not speculation about arithmetical equality, 
but experience. Experience demonstrated that no 
arithmetically-based system of equality produced advantages 
comparable to those achieved in Great Britain. Speculative 
tampering endangered the constitution itself. Burke
declined to risk the constitution for the hope of improving
i t .
The Rockingham ministry lasted only three months. The 
Marquis died in July 1782, and Shelburne replaced him as
prime minister. The Rockingham Whigs, now led by Charles
James Fox, returned to the opposition. The Shelburne 
ministry quickly failed, however, and Fox and North formed a 
coalition ministry in 1783. Burke was again appointed 
Paymaster.
The Foxite Whigs still opposed Crown influence in 1783, 
but they saw the need, now, for an expansion of 
Parliamentary control over India. They therefore proposed 
that control in India be given to a council composed of
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members appointed, in practice, by themselves. Inevitably, 
perhaps unjustifiably, opponents saw in "Fox's East India 
Bill" a power grab.40
In this context, Burke delivered his first major speech on 
the subject of India. He spoke for three hours on December 
1, 1783 in defense of Fox's bill.4* Opponents had raised 
four objections to the bill, and Burke responded to each.
The vast majority of the speech, however, was devoted to the 
claim that Fox's bill violated the East India Company's 
chartered rights. Burke himself, as well as the Rockingham 
Whigs, had defended these rights of the Company a decade 
earlier.4̂  But he argued now that these chartered rights 
could not be used as a defense for the violation of other, 
more fundamental rights. 4̂  The Indians, Burke argued, had 
the right to expect that their government exercise power for 
their collective benefit. The East India Company habitually 
and incorrigibly abused that trust. Thus their contract 
with Parliament was broken. Parliament had the right and 
the obligation, Burke argued, to take power from the Company 
and develop other means of governing India.
Despite heavy opposition, the bill almost passed. 
However, the king, deeply dissatisfied with the Fox-North 
ministry, used the bill to maneuver the fall of that 
coalition. The bill failed in the House of Lords and, on 
December 18, 1783, the king dismissed the Fox-North 
ministry. William Pitt, second son of Lord Chatham, became
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Prime Minister and dominated the ministry into the next 
century. Burke never again held a government post.
Burke's interest in India predated Fox's East India 
Bill. In 1781, Burke had been appointed to an ongoing 
Select Committee to investigate injustice in India. He soon 
became its leading member, and the Committee's comprehensive 
accounts attest to Burke's detailed knowledge of and 
interest in Indian affairs. Moreover, Burke's "cousin" Will 
Burke had Indian connections.44 In 1781, Burke himself had 
tangled with one of the Nawab of Arcot's creditors in the 
East India Company. Then, in response to complaints from 
Indian Governor Macartney regarding the finances of the 
nawab and his creditors in the East India Company, Fox and 
Burke put a clause in their East India Bill ordering an 
investigation and settlement of the n a w a b 's debts. When 
that bill failed, Pitt included this provision in his bill. 
Pitt's bill passed, but the investigation was cursory. The 
investigating Board ordered full settlement of the debts 
from public funds.45 Burke objected to this settlement on 
February 28, 1785 in his lengthy speech on the "Nabob 
[Nawab] of Arcot's Debts."45 Burke tried to unravel a 
complicated web of collusion and corruption. He attacked 
the nawab, the Company, and the ministry. The debts, he 
claimed, were fraudulent, and the Pitt ministry was 
deliberately concealing the sinister nature of the 
transactions. He urged Parliament to reassert its authority
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over India and to conduct an investigation. However, 
Parliament handily defeated the motion for a "special 
inquiry." Burke then turned his attention from the Madras 
government in Southern India to the Bengal presidency in 
Northern India and Warren Hastings.
Hastings, as Governor General of India since 1774, 
organized several successful military operations that 
protected and even expanded British holdings. However, he 
implemented questionable, if typical, methods to provide 
money for these military operations, and his military 
campaigns were ruthless.47 Burke's investigations into 
Indian affairs convinced him that Hastings was severely 
violating Indian rights. He instigated impeachment 
impeachment proceedings against Hastings in 1785. The trial 
did not begin, however, until 1788, and it lasted seven 
years, until 1795. According to most of his contemporaries, 
the Hastings impeachment obsessed Burke. But Burke never 
had any realistic chance of convicting Hastings, and 
Hastings was ultimately acquitted.
Other Whigs in Burke's circle soon tired of the 
impeachment. Burke, however, obstinately continued with the 
trial. A small fissure thus opened between Burke and his 
party. By 1788 Burke, who had long been a chief spokesman 
for and leading member of the Rockinghamites, moved only on 
his party's periphery.
Burke worked in tandem with his party once more, during
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the regency crisis of 1788-9. George III suffered a lengthy 
bout of illness and insanity that year, and Parliament 
fought over the conditions of a regency. Pitt and his 
administration argued that Parliament should determine the 
conditions. The Foxite Whigs, who had courted the 
friendship of the Prince of Wales, insisted that the Prince 
should succeed automatically. Burke agreed fervently with 
his party here. Earlier in his career, he had feared the 
extension of crown influence. Now, in Pitt's position on 
the regency, he saw a new threat— an extension of the 
democratic principle. The Crown was hereditary, not 
elective, Burke insisted with his party, and Parliament did 
not have the right to tamper with the succession.^ The 
king, however, recovered his health in February 1789, and 
the crisis ended.
By 1789, then, Burke's usefulness to this party was 
declining, and he had begun to suspect that popular rather 
than Crown influence presented the primary threat to the 
constitutional order. These two factors reinforced rather 
than contradicted the direction that Burke then took. For 
the French were about to shake the world with their 
revolution for liberty, equality, and fraternity. And 
Burke, contrary to the tendency of his party, was about to 
become the chief and most eloquent critic of that 
Revolution.
Charles-Jean-Francois Depont received his first letter
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from Burke regarding the French Revolution a full year 
before Burke finished his second letter to Depont, the 
Reflections on the Revolution in France.^ Already, in 
this first letter, Burke displayed grave doubts regarding 
events in France.'*® He described freedom as social and 
practical, rather than as individual and abstract. Freedom, 
he insisted, had to be secured by law and equality of 
restraint; it had to unite a strong government with 
individual liberty. The French, however, seemed far from 
the mark. First, they had confiscated church property.
This act contradicted the principle of prescription, the 
principle of undisturbed possession of property that alone 
could secure that possession. Second, the French had based 
their government on abstractions; they had ignored 
experience and concrete circumstances. Third, they had been 
too eager and rash in their resort to violence. They had 
neglected the chance of reform and opted, instead, for means 
that were certainly destructive and ideal ends that were, at 
best, uncertain. The French, Burke concluded, lacked 
moderation, justice, and "tenderness" towards individuals. 
Burke was profoundly dubious that they deserved approval.
Burke's first public pronouncement on the French 
Revolution occurred on February 9, 1790 in his "Speech in 
the Debate on the Army Estimates."'*1 France's actual 
power, Burke admitted, had been weakened by her revolution. 
Her influence and example, however, were another matter.
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The French promoted anarchy and atheism. They intended to 
level all distinctions. They exhibited an extremist 
character and an innovative spirit and, in effect, advocated 
revolution over reform. They had destroyed their own 
institutional balances, attacked property, and created an 
undisciplined, licentious military that was not controlled 
by their National Assembly. The French were not imitating, 
but threatening, the English Revolution of 1688. Burke 
warned that he would abandon his friends, if necessary, in 
order to combat the contagious influence of French ideas.
In 1790, Burke published his greatest attack on the 
French Revolution, his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France- He began defensively; his horror at and contempt 
for the French Revolution did not base itself, he insisted, 
on any general opposition to liberty. But, he argued, 
liberty could not be judged abstractly. A criminal might 
escape from jail, but this would not, then, be cause for 
rejoicing over the increase in liberty.^ The 
circumstances of liberty affected the judgment. "The effect 
of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they 
please. We ought to see what it will please them to do. 
Thus, Burke refused to extend congratulations to the French 
simply because they claimed the cause of liberty.
Burke resisted any comparison between the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 in England and the- French Revolution. He 
argued that three doctrines, used to defend the French
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Revolution and supposed to derive from the English 
Revolution, were actually antithetical to English 
government. First, he defended hereditary succession 
against elective choice. The Glorious Revolution, he 
claimed, never advanced the right of people to choose their 
own governors. The selection of King William of Orange was 
an act of necessity: "It is against all genuine principles
of jurisprudence to draw a principle from a law made in a 
special case, and regarding an individual person."^ The 
Glorious Revolution, in fact, consciously and rightly turned 
away from election and established the hereditary succession 
of the crown. Second, Burke distanced the Glorious 
Revolution from the claimed right to cashier governments for 
misconduct. Burke insisted that a strong government 
provided security for freedom, and revolution for 
misconduct, if practiced, would weaken and destabilize a 
government. Wise men would choose revolution only as a last 
resource for an extreme breach of the original contract 
between rulers and ruled. And, even then, revolution would 
be a question of war, not of constitutional principle, of 
means and ends, not of rights. Third, Burke denied that 
the Glorious Revolution established the right of people to 
form a government for themselves. The English, Burke 
asserted, ensured their rights and liberties through 
hereditary title, a safe method of transmission that did not 
preclude improvement. The French, however, had thrown over
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tradition and inheritance for the gains that could be 
derived from virtue and reason. And, Burke claimed, virtue 
and reason that had not become habituated through tradition 
were extremely feeble, insecure foundations for freedom.
The Glorious Revolution had not rejected tradition but had, 
in fact, "proceeded upon the reference to antiquity."^
Thus, the Glorious Revolution did not establish the 
principles invoked by the French to legitimate their 
revolution.
Burke despised the French destruction of the orders in 
favor of equality. Unlike equality, the orders corresponded 
to nature. Since power always existed in someone's hands, 
the leveling of orders merely relocated power. The question 
was not whether the orders prevented an impossible equality, 
but whether a different distribution of power benefitted the 
country. One wanted a government in the hands of the wise 
and virtuous. Although a government based on a balance of 
the natural orders of society did not directly provide this, 
such a government had two aspects to recommend it. First, 
the orders restrained each other. Change in such a 
government had to be a matter of compromise, and compromise 
"naturally begets moderation" and frustrates arbitrary 
power. Second, the orders were based on property, and, 
even if the large proprietors were incompetent, they 
provided stability, "the ballast in the vessel of the 
commonwealth."60 The French, however, had fused their
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orders into one and located power in the National Assembly. 
The Assembly, Burke claimed, was so far from being wise and 
virtuous that he derived all his dire predictions regarding 
the course of the revolution simply by noting the membership 
of that Assembly.
Burke did not deny the existence of rights. He argued 
that the rights of men invoked by the French differed 
qualitatively from the English conception of rights.
English rights derived their legitimacy from the 
constitution whose merits had been tested by experience.
The French offered, instead, the universal right of men.
But, Burke reasoned, the laws of nature had to be 
distinguished from those of civil society. In nature, men 
asserted the right to survive and to be their own judge. 
However, in order to obtain the security and justice of 
civil society, men relinquished these rights of self- 
government. Thus, liberty in society meant, at the same 
time, restraint. But the precise balance of liberty and 
restraint varied; it could never be settled by an abstract 
rule. Instead, the construction of a just government 
required prudence, skill, and experience. "The rights of 
men are in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but 
not impossible to discern . . . .  Political reasoning is a 
computing principle."61
Burke contended that two considerations affected the 
justifiability of a revolution: first, what is thrown off
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should be unbearably oppressive and incapable of reform,- 
and, second, what is proposed as replacement should be an 
improvement. With these considerations in mind, Burke 
examined the institutions leveled by the revolution; the 
church, the monarchy, and the nobility.
Burke argued that the state needed some form of church 
establishment. The atheism professed by so many of France's 
revolutionary leaders distressed him. He believed that 
men's original uninstructed natures were suspect. It was 
"therefore of infinite importance that they should not be 
suffered to imagine that their will . . . is the standard of
right and w r o n g . R e l i g i o u s  principles benefitted 
ordinary citizens, but they were even more necessary for 
leaders. Further, Burke considered the established church 
in France to be neither so terribly oppressive that it 
deserved the punishment of destruction nor so intransigent 
that attempts at reform were useless. Thus, French attacks 
on their church establishment were unjustifiable.
Burke then catalogued the atrocities of the French 
Revolution. He contended that nothing could justify such 
actions but the belief that the only alternative to their 
conduct was the monarchy, and that their own mob tyranny 
produced a better state of affairs. With the criteria 
loaded in this fashion, Burke admitted that abuses existed 
under the old regime. But, Burke asked, was the French 
government so "incapable or undeserving of reform . . . that
it was of absolute necessity the whole fabric should be at 
once pulled down, and the area cleared for the erection of a 
theoretical experimental edifice in it place.' The issue 
was not abuse, but the choice between reform and 
destruction, and the monarchy had demonstrated its 
willingness to reform. Additionally, Burke maintained, 
France had materially improved under its former system. And 
while liberty might merit the sacrifice of wealth and 
comfort, Burke cautioned that "one ought to be pretty sure 
it is a real liberty which is purchased and that she is to 
be purchased at no other price. " The present system did 
not offer a real liberty. The former system possessed 
potential for reform. The emasculation of the monarchy 
simply could not be justified.
Not surprisingly, Burke found also, in the case of the 
nobility, that they were neither incapable of reform nor 
truly oppressive. Burke argued that, on the eve of the 
Revolution, a consensus had formed in favor of ending the 
absolute monarchy. "All the struggle, all the dissension 
arose afterwards upon the preference of a despotic democracy 
to a government of reciprocal controul."^ Burke denied 
that the abuses attributed to the nobility warranted their 
destruction. "It is not with much credulity," he wrote, 
that "I listen to any, when they speak evil of those whom 
they are going to plunder."^
Finally, after discrediting any excuse for destruction
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of the orders, Burke asked whether the new government had 
demonstrated its competence. He ridiculed its 
inconsistencies, but, beyond this, he believed the 
experiment was doomed to end in despotism. Liberty could 
not exist without restraint. And, Burke argued, the French 
had destroyed the sources of restraint. Wise leadership 
could generate restraint, but the leaders in the Assembly 
were not wise. The balance of orders provided an even surer 
source of restraint, as it depended on structure rather than 
virtue, but this, too, the French had destroyed. Thus,
Burke charged that the French would ultimately have to turn 
to the army. Only force remained to support the government. 
"Troops again— Massacre, torture, hanging! These are your 
rights of m e n !
On January 19, 1791, Burke wrote "A Letter to a Member 
of the National Assembly" of France.6® In addition to 
updating his Reflections, Burke wished to urge outside 
intervention against France. Counter-revolution in France, 
Burke insisted, was critical to British security, yet 
impossible without foreign assistance. The French 
government was the design of evil men who were hostile to 
reason, indifferent to the misery they created, incapable of 
repentance, and disposed towards extreme remedies. The 
French state, inspired by the students of Rousseau, wished 
to recreate the moral nature of man. They attacked domestic 
trust, elegant manners, fear of God, and even the mode of
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civilized warfare. Internally, France now lacked the will, 
the character, and the institutions to correct her errors. 
She constituted a danger to the European order. England 
should thus actively pursue counter-revolution in France. 
"Society," Burke wrote, "cannot exist unless a controlling 
power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the 
less of it there is within, the more there must be 
without. 1,69
Burke's party, under Fox's leadership, generally
sympathized with the French Revolution. Fox, like most
Englishmen, knew little about France. As an Englishman, he
did know, however, that he opposed French absolutism. This
prejudice in favor of English constitutionalism, combined
with a tendency to gloss over ideological details, led to
Fox's early declaration of support for the French
Revolution. On July 30, 1789, he wrote regarding the taking
of the Bastille: "How much the greatest event it is that
70ever happened in the world! and how much the best!"
Burke at first attributed Fox's glowing tributes to the
French Revolution to zeal. He nonetheless felt compelled to 
71disagree. Finally, on May 6, 1791, Burke's collaboration 
with the Foxite Whigs ended. Burke renounced his friendship 
with Fox because of their disagreement over the French 
Revolution. He crossed the aisle and seated himself with 
Pitt. Fox fought to protect his friendship with Burke. He 
admitted that serious differences of opinion divided them.
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But, he argued, "they had differed formerly on many 
subjects, and yet it did not interrupt their friendship."77 
But Burke remained adamant that "he had done his duty at the 
price of his friend— that their friendship was at an 
end."73 Despite later attempts by Fox to recapture their 
mutual good will, Burke never forgave him. The Rockingham 
Whigs disintegrated over the next few years as its members 
chose sides.
Burke justified his break with the Foxite Whigs over 
the French Revolution in An Appeal from the New to the Old 
Whigs As usual, he attacked the French Revolution, 
arguing that it was both evil and dangerous. He also 
defended himself against charges of inconsistency. Burke 
held that his rejection of the French Revolution 
contradicted neither his own career nor the principles of 
his party.
The Foxite Whigs charged that Burke had changed. 
Formerly he had supported reform and revolution. Now he 
rejected the French struggle to achieve liberty. Burke 
responded by an appeal to the principles of mixed government 
and to the ancient constitution. The British constitution, 
he noted, had three parts, and each part possessed its own 
principle. Circumstances determined which part needed 
defense. During his career, he had defended the 
constitution, the balance of King, Lords, and Commons, not 
simply one of its parts. If his positions appeared
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inconsistent, the explanation lay in changing circumstances 
rather than in any inconsistency in his principles. The 
French desired to level all ranks. To oppose the French did 
not mean that he had abandoned any former sympathy for 
popular influence. He had, it was true, defended that 
influence in the past. He had also, however, opposed it 
when it threatened to predominate. "One would think," he 
wrote regarding the new Whigs' argument, "that such a thing
7 Ras a medium had never been heard of in the moral world." J 
Moreover, his support for the American Revolution and his 
opposition to the French Revolution did not indicate any 
shift in his beliefs. If the Americans had rebelled, as the 
French did, for more liberty, Burke would have opposed them. 
However, they had acted simply to defend ancient liberties. 
It was not a matter of supporting, and now opposing, the 
popular cause or the right of revolution. Instead, Burke 
defended the mixed and ancient British constitution.
Burke then defined the principles of his party to show 
that the Foxite Whigs, not he, had deviated from them.7̂
Fox and his supporters, he claimed, believed that 
sovereignty unalienably resided with the people, and that 
the people could therefore overthrow governments and form 
new ones at will. These new Whigs opposed aristocracy and 
the law of primogeniture, criticized Commons and the 
monarchy, and recommended France as a model. Burke argued 
against these new Whigs that such beliefs would not only
subvert government and morality, but that they also 
contradicted former old Whig principles. The Glorious 
Revolution, an act of necessity, not right, recovered the 
ancient constitution following James II's violation of it.
No essential change had resulted from the Revolution. Mixed 
government of King, Lords, and Commons and hereditary 
succession had been preserved. Sovereignty resided with the 
legislature, not the people, and that sovereignty was not 
based in will but was itself restrained by fundamental 
principles of government and the rules of moral obligation. 
While government did found itself in an implied and 
expressed contract, contracts were not simply breachable 
acts of will. They implied a duty above will, and duty was 
obligatory, not voluntary. Good government included within 
it the principles of restraint of inordinate desires and of 
prudent direction. The multitude possessed neither. A 
democracy was incurably ambitious. The people should 
function to check authority, not to direct it, and the 
aristocracy should form the leading and guiding part of 
society. The British constitution, based on an accumulated 
understanding of and accommodation to human nature, achieved 
balance. It prevented the dominance of one principle at the 
expense of others, and thus it invariably involved 
compromise. These were the principles of the old Whigs. 
Burke still supported them. The new Whigs, won over now to 
the incompatible abstract principle of the rights of man.
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were the deviants.
By December 1791 the Pitt government seemed ready to
recognize the new order in France. Burke wrote Thoughts on
77French Affairs to argue against that recognition." The 
revolution in France represented a revolution in doctrine, 
rather than simple political change. The French preached 
their doctrine of the rights of man in foreign countries. 
There, like an alternative religious doctrine, French 
revolutionary principles worked to weaken patriotic ties and 
to forge bonds based on similarity of opinion. Their 
doctrine was essentially, even explicitly, incompatible with 
the existing Christian, European order . ^  Furthermore, 
France's danger could not be dismissed on the basis of her 
supposed weakened condition. The situation in France was 
unique and completely new. History and experience were 
useless guides for gauging her strength. However, it could 
be seen that forces competent to wage a counter-revolution 
no longer existed within France. In the absence of external 
interference, France would remain a persistent danger. 
Recognition could only increase that danger and assist the 
spread of France's hostile, fanatical doctrine.
By 1792 Burke, long known for his support of religious 
toleration, opposed the petition of religious dissenters to
?Qalter the Test and Corporation Acts. The Dissenters—  
Unitarians, Presbyterians, and Baptists— appealed to natural 
rights arguments and were led by men such as Reverend
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HORichard Price and Reverend Joseph Priestley. Burke
argued now that the petition could not be decided upon 
abstract grounds. Circumstances had to guide the decisions 
of statesmen. And here, the relief would affect not simply 
individuals seeking freedom of conscience, but a dangerous 
political faction. This faction, Burke believed, actively 
and explicitly sought to ruin the established Church. Its 
dissent was fundamental in nature— not a mere disagreement 
over ritual, but a denial of the whole establishment. The 
Dissenters posed a constitutional threat, and Burke pleaded 
for the defeat of their demands.
Burke retired from Parliament in 1794. Still, his 
interest in political affairs continued. In 1795, scarcity 
and famine in England resulted in demonstrations and bread 
riots. The Pitt government toyed with a tax to prop up 
agricultural wages and with restrictions on trade to control 
prices. Burke opposed such plans. In November 1795 he 
wrote Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, to argue that 
governmental efforts to relieve the distresses of the poor 
would be futile.®* Essentially Burke objected that 
governmental interference would violate the natural laws of 
the market and thus do more harm than good for everyone 
concerned. If agricultural wages fell below a subsistence 
level, then the appropriate vehicle of relief was private 
charity. The principles of Christianity imposed on 
individuals the duty to aid others. Beyond this, neither
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necessity nor right impelled government to meddle with 
natural market operations. Government could not and should 
not try to eliminate poverty.
Burke also remained concerned about his native country. 
Ireland. In 1791 Richard Burke, Jr., had become an agent 
for the Catholic Committee in London. The Committee was 
hopelessly divided in its interests, and Richard never 
effectively advanced its influence. However, he and his 
father exchanged many letters regarding Ireland while he 
held this position. Edmund, who had remained sympathetic 
with the Irish Catholics, still opposed the disabilities 
that Parliament imposed on them. He made it clear in his 
letters to his son that he considered Jacobinism, and its 
doctrine of the rights of man, the dominant danger in the 
world. Unlike the doctrines of Dissenters, Catholic dogma 
might provide an ideological bulwark against the Jacobin 
rights of men. English Protestants would advance their 
interests best by making common cause with Catholics against 
the Jacobin atheists.
Burke repeated this argument in his letter to his Irish 
friend. Sir Hercules Langrishe, a member for Knocktopher in 
the Dublin parliament who had opposed enlargement of the 
franchise.^ Burke disagreed with Langrishe's views. He 
confided to his friend that he could not entirely blame the 
Irish for their resort to mob action given the indignities 
they had suffered under the popery laws. Burke condemned
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the practice of proscribing a whole nation; not all Irish
were seditious. He argued instead that it would be not only-
just and humane but also expeditious for the British to lift
the restrictions against the Irish Catholics. Reform of the
popery laws would unite the Irish to the English through
common interest.
In 1793, the Pitt government conceded voting rights to
the Irish, but still refused them the right to enter
Parliament or to hold office. Burke, who had fought for the
enlargement of the Irish franchise, now fretted over the
incompleteness of the reform. The poor and ignorant had
been enfranchised. But, he complained, Ireland desperately
needed aristocratic leadership, and Parliament denied the
00leading Irish Catholics access to that influence. To the
end of his life, Burke remained convinced that British
policy towards Ireland was ill-conceived. It should be
magnanimous and generous; instead it was suspicious and
repressive. The principles and disciplines of the Catholic
religion were antithetical to Jacobinism. British policy,
rather than gathering the Irish into the Commonwealth as a
bulwark against Jacobinism, instead worked to drive them
fi4towards the atheistic doctrine. "Poor souls," he wrote 
of British policy-makers in 1797, just before he died.
"They are to be pitied, who think of nothing but dangers 
long passed by; and but little of the perils that actually 
surround them.
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When Burke retired, the Pitt government granted him a 
pension. Burke's opponents then claimed that the pension 
was Burke's pay-off for reversing his earlier views and 
opposing the French Revolution.86 To defend himself, Burke 
wrote A Letter to a Noble Lord.87 He explained that 
pensions for service and merit were entirely consistent with 
his program of Economical Reform of 1782. Then he reviewed 
the highlights of his own career, especially the Economical 
Reform and his efforts on behalf of India, and insisted that 
he had earned his pension. He compared his pension and its 
origin to the enormous fortunes inherited by two of his 
critics, the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of Lauderdale. 
Normally, Burke explained, he would forego investigation 
into the origin of vast fortunes. But the attack of the 
Lords on his own small pension prompted him to a comparison. 
And, Burke demonstrated, the origin of the Lords' fortunes 
was sordid. The Lords benefitted by leaving the history of 
their own wealth veiled and unquestioned. Burke valued the 
nobility. This order linked the generations and provided 
stability and coherence to the State. But, he warned, the 
French, whom the Lords seemed to admire, would never 
tolerate noble rank, privilege, and wealth. Thus, Burke 
concluded, the Lords should be more watchful of their own 
interests..
France, of course, continued to haunt Burke after his 
retirement. In the war against France, William Pitt
employed the strategy that his father had used so 
successfully against France in the 1750s. He focused 
British energies on colonial and naval activity. The 
continent was to be defended by a coalition funded by 
British subsidies. This time, however, France fared far 
better than she had a generation earlier. Consequently, by 
1795, Pitt, who had never shared Burke's crusading 
convictions about France, began to seek a negotiated peace. 
Burke, wild with grief over his son's death the previous 
year as.well as being convinced that Europe faced a grave 
crisis, wrote four lengthy and gloomy letters opposing such 
a “Regicide Peace."®8
In his first letter, Burke argued that the ministry 
should not be discouraged by the lack of zeal for the war. 
Zeal was inspired from above, not below, and France 
certainly supplied ample reason for opposing her. France 
had inverted her entire system of manners. She elevated 
crude instincts over refined virtues, attacked family, 
marriage, and legitimacy, and was fierce, licentious, and 
even, he charged, cannibalistic. By attacking the family, 
France had attacked the basis of Christian and aristocratic 
culture for family relations provided the model for the
0Qacceptance of established roles and place. Thus France 
had not simply instituted a new government, but had rejected 
the entire familiar way of life of European civilization. 
France was inherently hostile to other governments. Peace
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with her was illusory. The decision for war rested with the 
crown, not popular opinion, and the government could easily 
promote popular sympathy by revealing the real justness of 
this war.
Burke's second letter explored the reasons for the 
weakness of the alliance against France. First, the war had 
been fought defensively. Outright defeat of France had 
never been seriously attempted. Second, the allies had 
fought at odds with each other, each seeking to make 
individual profit from the war. Third, France had 
erroneously been treated as if she were a normal enemy. Her 
leaders sought her exterior aggrandizement as their primary 
object, and, unlike other countries, she benefitted from her 
unity of purpose. France had become simply a vehicle for 
domination, externally as well as internally, and normal 
relations with her were impossible.
Burke's third and fourth letters continued to argue 
against negotiations with France. He examined English 
resources in the third letter. Surrender was neither in 
Great Britain's foreign or domestic interest nor mandated by 
any lack of resources to fight the war. Burke's last letter 
took up again the topic of the character of the French 
government. Its leaders were tyrannical usurpers. They 
attacked every cherished value of European civilization, and 
they relied on force, not law, to inflict their doctrines on 
others. Peace, Burke reiterated in this unfinished letter.
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was literally impossible with such a faction. 
Burke died of stomach cancer in 1797.90
CHAPTER 2 
EARLIER INTERPRETATIONS OF BURKE
Edmund Burke never systematically defined his 
philosophy. Instead, he revealed various aspects of his 
beliefs gradually, over a period of forty years, as he 
reacted to events. Not surprisingly, then, scholars have 
argued from then to now over the content of Burke's 
philosophy. Some have interpreted Burke's approach as
Q1utilitarian. Others have found in Burke a defense of 
medieval Natural L a w . ^  Some denied his consistency.
Others upheld it. Some insisted on Burke's essential 
morality. Others saw in Burke only a politician who changed 
beliefs according to the demands of circumstances and 
convenience. This chapter summarizes three representative 
interpretations and attempts to locate the weaknesses in 
e a c h .
Alfred Cobban, in Edmund Burke and the Revolt against 
the Eighteenth Century (1960), contended that Edmund Burke 
clung to traditional ideas in an unsuccessful fight against 
the emergence of more modern eighteenth-century ideas.
Cobban first explained eighteenth-century ideas, then 
presented Burke's ideas. The ideas of the eighteenth 
century, of that period between the two European revolutions 
of 1688 and 1789, Cobban wrote, provided the bridge between
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the theological ideology of medievalism and the secular 
ideology of modernity.^ Understanding of both the 
workings of the universe and the way in which the universe 
could be known changed in that century. The laws of nature 
replaced Providence, and John Locke's tabula rasa replaced 
Cartesian innate ideas. These new understandings, 
however, involved disparate approaches. The laws of nature, 
such as the principles of classical economics, were 
discovered deductively.^ On the other hand, Lockean 
psychology, the theory that all knowledge comes from 
experience, pointed away from theory entirely and focused
Q7rather on phenomena. ' Knowledge, here, became a matter of 
compiling lists rather than of discovering ultimate secrets.
Lockean psychology, though hopelessly incomplete, 
nonetheless freed knowledge from its dependence upon 
authority. Internal, individual observation rather than 
external, divine revelation provided the foundation of 
knowledge. This meant, among other things, that progress, 
now understood as possible, even desirable, could replace
QOmedieval inevitability and resignation. In addition,
morality now required new underpinnings. The ethical 
philosophy of utilitarianism substituted, in the place of 
the theological distinctions between good and evil, a modern 
secular law of nature, a calculation of pleasure and pain as
QQthe original basis for moral decisions.”
This eighteenth-century system of ideas developed
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differently in England than it did in France. An 
optimistic, individualistic, and utilitarian world view came 
to dominate nineteenth-century England. In France, however, 
Lockean ideas fed a revolution which contradictorily 
asserted individual rights while it denied individuality. 
Locke's psychology implied the natural equality of all men. 
The French focused on this equality and thereby obliterated 
not only the legitimacy of class distinctions, but the 
significance of any individual differences whatsoever.100
Cobban claimed that Burke, though believing himself to 
be a follower of Locke, substantially departed from him.
The Lockean social contract had provided a bridge between 
the state of nature and political society.101 In order to 
enforce the laws of nature, men adopted the rule of 
political society. However, Burke conceived of law, natural 
rights, and the social contract differently than did Locke. 
Thus Burke reconstructed Lockean theory in a way that was 
neither intended by Locke nor adopted by the majority of his 
foilowers.
Burke invoked a different law than did Locke. Locke, 
and most heirs of the Enlightenment, essentially equated the 
law of nature with the law of reason. Burke, however, never 
shared the Enlightenment's faith in human reason. 
Imperfections of both reason and will hampered human 
attempts to grasp the true laws of nature. For Burke, the 
laws of nature meant the laws of God; man's laws merely
tried to declare God's laws. Where Lockean law appealed to 
natural right and reason. Burkean law founded itself on 
divine obligation and Providence. For Burke, law thus 
implied some definite code which derived its legitimacy from 
its approximation to God's law and only tenuously, even 
accidentally, coincided with reason. Burkean law, which 
tended to legitimate codified law on the authority of divine 
law, was thus essentially conservative and a distinct 
departure from Locke .
Laws, however, existed to defend some rights, and Burke
radically altered the Lockean conception of natural 
11)1rights. J Burke admitted the existence of natural rights, 
but he qualified his admission in two ways. First, he did 
not conceive of man as either moral or even rational 
independent of society. M a n ’s moral nature derived from and 
was conditioned by the society in which he l i v e d . ^
Second, he argued that men surrendered their abstract 
natural rights when they entered society in exchange for the 
real, positive benefits they could gain in society. 
Government existed, not to defend abstractions, but to 
provide for the concrete welfare of its people. The 
abstract rights of the state of nature became utilitarian 
benefits in political s o c i e t y . T h u s ,  man's inalienable 
rights in the state of nature held some meaning for Burke, 
but they never came close to approximating an ideal against 
which civil government could be measured.
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Burke conceived of the social contract as more 
permanent and inviolable than did Locke. First, Loc k e ’s 
social contract existed simply because it provided a means 
by which the law of nature might be enforced.*®® The 
contract, allied as it was with reason, was accepted anew by
107each generation. Burke's social contract, on the other 
hand, served to link man's laws with God's and to protect 
man from the imperfections of his own nature.*®® For 
Burke, the social contract was passed down from generation 
to generation, and reason was subordinated to tradition and 
custom.*®® Second, while both Locke and Burke accepted 
revolution as a recourse against violation of the social 
contract, Burke's state of nature violated man's needs far 
more than did Locke's. A Burkean revolution, consequently, 
required a profoundly more desperate deterioration of the 
contract than did a Lockean revolution.**® Thus, Burkean 
definitions of law, natural rights, and social contract 
transformed Lockean ideas into conservative doctrine.
Cobban's analysis thus rested on the implicit 
assumption that Lockean philosophy dominated eighteenth- 
century European thought. Locke published his theories in 
the seventeenth century. Lockean assumptions provided the 
foundation for nineteenth-century liberal philosophy. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be assumed from these two facts that 
eighteenth-century thought represented, in essence, an 
exploration of Lockean assumptions. History does not
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necessarily progress s y 1logistically; eighteenth-century 
debates require examination on their own t e r m s . I n  
fact, Burke rarely mentioned Locke, and eighteenth-century
thought was far richer and more complex than Cobban
admitted.^ Cobban's interpretation of Burke as a
"departure" from or "transformation" of Locke missed some of
Burke. Burke's philosophy represents more than an addendum 
to Locke. Understanding of any philosophy is enriched 
through an understanding of its historical context. Burke 
especially requires this contextual foundation. His 
philosophy emerged in the context of debates over specific, 
contemporary events. To understand Burke, one must 
understand how the world appeared to him and, if Locke did 
not much concern him, it is important to consider who or 
what did.
Whereas Cobban erred by misinterpreting the historical 
context, those who saw in Burke an exponent of Natural Law 
ignored that context altogether. Their analyses provided 
unifying themes for Burke's circumstantial reactions. These 
themes, though often essentially correct in themselves, 
nonetheless obscured the situational aspects of Burke's 
thought and thus skewed Burke's intended meaning. Further, 
these ahistorical explanations failed to indicate Burke's 
similarities to and differences with his contemporaries.
Thus they hid Burke's original contributions to political 
thought.
Charles Parkin, In The Moral Basis of Burke's Political 
Thought (1956), incorporated much of what Burke wrote and 
said into such a comprehensive system. He maintained that 
Burke could not be adequately understood if his moral values 
and their relevance to his ideas were neglected. When 
Burke's ideas were stripped of the moral values that gave 
them meaning, only their empirical connotation remained.
With his ideas reduced in this way, Burke emerged as simply 
a philosopher of expediency.113 Hoping to discredit such 
oversimplification. Parkin explored Burke's ideas within 
their moral context.
Parkin recognized that, for Burke, political thinking 
could not be abstracted from the concrete situation that 
prompted it. Nonetheless, Burke's political responses had a 
theoretical foundation in his conception of the Social 
Contract.114 Burke, in attacking metaphysical or abstract 
rights, did not reject Contract theory. He simply distanced 
himself from the radical interpretation of that theory which 
did not distinguish between natural and civil rights. Burke 
believed that natural rights applied only to individuals in 
isolation. The basic natural right of self-government, 
uncompromised, precluded any possibility of social union.
Any attempt to incorporate full natural rights as a 
criterion for the legitimacy of society fundamentally 
subverted that society.115 Hence, natural rights could 
never correspond strictly to civil rights.
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Bur k e ’s rejection of radical natural rights went
further than this logic, however. To Burke, the radical
conception of natural rights was based upon a human nature
in which man's societal character remained secondary to that
nature. However, Burke's view of human nature rose above
this radical conception. To Burke, man could not fully be
himself independent of society. On the most obvious level,
individuals in isolation could not achieve their material
good; people needed the advantages social union
provided.116 More profoundly, however, Burke believed that
man's basic nature was to be found in its most developed,
rather than in its most rudimentary, state. The
unrestrained passions of self-will, incapable of recognizing
reciprocal duties, did not represent human nature. Rather
117true human nature was essentially social and moral.11'
Men, Burke believed, instinctively recognized that the good 
of each was bound up with the good of others. The natural 
rights of radical philosophers were simply primitive rights 
that prevented men from realizing their truest and fullest 
development.11® The true, full innate rights of man, based 
on instinct rather than passion, were the recognition of the 
rights of others and the obligations imposed by that 
recognition.110 This conception of a developed human 
nature as the harmony between instinct and morality. Parkin 
claimed, constituted the basis of Burke's moral and 
political thought.120 On this basis, Burke could only
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understand the radical conception of the rights of man as
grotesquely destructive nonsense.
Men subordinated themselves to government in order to
protect the "true" natural rights of civil society.
Government, then, could legitimately restrain individuals
who interfered with the rights of other individuals. Burke
added to this Lockean outline of the legitimate role of
government the further stipulation that government could
restrain an individual from interfering with his own
development. Of course, government did not possess
unchecked sovereignty. Its legitimacy derived from it
original contract and was, therefore, limited. People had
consented to government in antiquity, and their consent was
1 91voided if the government sabotaged the contract. 61 Still,
Burkean consent meant that the people, though not logically
precluded from participation in government, had no natural
right to such participation. Participation depended on a
government's peculiar historical development, not on any
1 00innate natural right. 4 Burkean subordination of
government to consent of the governed included within it the
subordination of passion to moral sensibility. Government,
though devoted to the general happiness and in this sense
expedient, could not simply be reduced to expediency. Real
191happiness was distinct from desires and passions. 
Unrestrained passions degraded an individual, Burke 
reasoned; if an individual did not possess the wit to
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refrain from self-degradation, the government had the 
obligation to restrain him.*^
Parkin attempted, then, to derive Burke's belief in the 
aristocracy from his conception of human nature as 
harmonized instinct and morality. Burke understood society. 
Parkin began, as a "network of moral relations"14 that 
had, as their foundation, local, private affections such as 
those between family members. Society was composed, then, 
of hierarchical affiliations based on natural instincts and 
prejudices. In a stable society, the naturally occurring 
moral relations of rights and duties would be upheld and, in 
such a society, the natural (that is, propertied) 
aristocracy would emerge with a leading role. This 
propertied aristocracy united in itself self-interest and 
the good of the whole more fully than did any other order of 
society. Furthermore, it was, according to Parkin, "a 
necessary feature of this 'dominion of natural interests' 
that it should include a hierarchy of property: the greater
accumulations of property form the natural defence for the 
less."^6 In addition, the aristocracy, being natural and 
thus, by definition, possessing awareness of its duties as 
well as its rights, posed no danger to society. Finally, 
Burke did not support aristocratic government. He merely
177accepted the aristocracy as one order in society. 4 The 
presence in society of an aristocracy signalled the health 
of the society; its absence indicated society's disruption
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and perversion.
Whereas a natural aristocracy most nearly united self- 
interest and the general good within itself, the stability 
of society rested on a harmony of the general good and self- 
interest permeating the entire community. Such a harmony 
required an allowance of individual variety which did not, 
at the same time, degenerate into conflict. Burke resolved 
this apparent dilemma between individual differences and the. 
common good by refusing to separate a man's natural rights 
from his innate moral sensibility and by rejecting any 
obligation on the part of society to create equality. He 
refused to sacrifice natural, legitimate, salutary 
differences among men in order to impose an equality of 
condition .Li He believed, rather, in hierarchy. For 
Burke, only moral equality, i.e., the acceptance by each 
individual of the rights and duties appropriate to his 
station in life, could exist.139 To seek any other form of 
equality was to attempt the impossible and would merely end 
by substituting for a natural equality that had grown up 
through custom an untested, unnatural, distorted 
equal ity .130
Parkin, in examining Burke's criticism of the French 
Revolution, concluded that Burke's clear preference for 
experience over theory as a guide to political planning was, 
at bottom, a preference for one morality over another. The 
French Revolution, with its abstract ideals, amounted to a
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rejection of the objective moral order. The true moral
order derived from a divine will, not from human reason. In
elevating reason as the source of and criterion for
morality, the French actually elevated human will. Burke
maintained, however, that the assertion of the will negated
true morality. The French Revolution, which based itself
upon fundamentally invalid principles, could never produce
nianything other than evil results. 1
French abstract idealism, since it essentially promoted 
human will, subverted real virtue, i.e., it unleashed rather 
than restrained passion. The French choice of ideals that 
had no relation to concrete conditions revealed not, as the 
French supposed, a search for a loftier perfected morality, 
but rather a defective character. The refusal to grapple 
with real situational difficulties stemmed from a laziness 
and an impatience with complexity that could only become 
destructive in response to imperfection.133 The French 
drive for perfection, in fact, was both impious and cruel.
It was impious because it attributed to human reason 
qualities it did not possess; human reason was weak and 
needed contact with practical matters to compensate for its 
limitations. It was bound to be cruel because it ignored 
the variety of. individual endeavor and imposed, rather, a 
prudish, hard uniformity. The French imagined their 
superior reasoning allowed them to condemn people en masse 
for their principles or because of their social position .
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The individual thus was subordinated to abstract 
1 Hprinciple. J But, Burke maintained, political reasoning 
did not yield, as in geometry, propositions that could be 
determined to be true or false. Rather, political reasoning 
dealt with good and evil, and such judgments could not be 
made abstractly, but only in relation to actual persons or 
things.*34 The true, objective order ordained that good 
and evil were inseparably entwined. Wise political 
decisions balanced or compromised elements of good and evil 
rather than aiming at an absolute elimination of 
imperfection. Thus, Burke's rejection of the excessive 
rationalism of the French revolutionaries did not point 
simply to a utilitarian or opportunist practicality, but 
derived from a rejection of a morality founded in human 
wi 11 ,135
French aberration derived from its essential atheism. 
Abstract reason admitted no measure other than itself; it 
made each man his own judge, and this was, at heart, 
atheism. In addition, it increased the likelihood of flawed 
judgment; each man, now severed from organic relationship 
with others by his extreme subjectivity, had available only 
his solitary experience. Alone, the individual was foolish. 
He possessed no means of approaching wisdom.*36 The 
species was, however, wise. Wisdom could be found in 
prudence, not principle, and prudence was learned from 
history, not from deduction. The natural principles of-
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Inheritance and prescription supplied needed continuity and 
durability. Then, using the past as a guide, men might 
better discern the moral requirements of their own present,
1 07unique circumstances. ' The past did not fix the moral
order. Rather, the moral requirements of the present had
naturally grown out of past expressions of the moral order.
Situations continually changed. Therefore, the need for
reform would always a r i s e . H o w e v e r ,  true reform
conformed to two principles: conservation and correction.
Reform implied something worth correcting. The wise person
eschewed the destructive, lazy, impatient urges towards
novelty and innovation and chose, instead, the constructive,
11Qdeliberate, steady work of gradual improvement. ’
Parkin successfully countered those scholars who saw in 
Burke simply an exponent of expediency. He correctly 
identified the moral sensibility that permeated Burke's 
responses. He appropriately drew attention to the 
prominence of Natural Law theory in Burke's ideology.
Still. Parkin did not address the historical context. Burke 
clearly accepted Natural Law assumptions, but Burkean 
conservatism cannot be reduced to those assumptions.
History as well as philosophy is needed to capture Burke. 
Philosophy can detect the unity in diversity. It is, 
however, utterly incapable of comprehending concrete 
circumstances and multiple relations. It always 
oversimp 1i fies.
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The interest theory historians lay at the other end of 
the spectrum from the Natural Law theorists. These 
scholars heeded the historical context, but they missed the 
continuity and commitment in Burke's philosophy. Carl B. 
Cone's historical analysis of Burke represents a 
sophisticated example of this type. Cone did not ignore 
Burke's philosophy. Instead Cone simply failed to integrate 
Burke's life and the meaning he gave it. In Burke and the 
Nature of Politics: The Age of the American Revolution.
Vol. 1 (1957), Cone argued that Burke had two careers.*4® 
Before the French Revolution, Burke was primarily a party 
politician. His work during and after the French Revolution 
earned him his reputation as a political philosopher.*41 
Using a biographical approach, Cone explained Burke's 
positions not only as reflections of his philosophy but also 
as products of the age in which he lived and the values and 
loyalties he cherished.
In 1770, after four years of association with the 
coterie affiliated with the Marquis of Rockingham, Burke 
became the first person to justify political parties.
Before this, all had agreed in principle that parties 
corrupted and subverted good government. Burke maintained, 
however, that while philosophers might find it sufficient to 
delineate correct political ends, a politician needed to 
consider, in addition, means for attaining those ends.
Burke argued that political parties supplied those means.
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Thus, a party could serve the distinguished statesman as 
well as the self-serving placeman; a party could advance as 
well as corrupt the national interest.
Cone argued that Burke played the game of politics well 
and often, devoting most of his time to political 
maneuverings. T h u s ' Cone reasoned, the fluctuations in 
Burke's political positions, could best be explained by his 
adherence to party policy. Burke, Cone maintained, did not 
commit himself to party politics in his early career because 
he found that the Rockingham Whigs echoed his principles. 
Rather, Burke held the positions he did because he was a 
Rockingham Whig and, as such, he reflected Whig policy.
Cone did not claim that Burke lacked principles in his 
earlier career. Rather, he thought that Bur k e ’s principles 
represented tendencies and loyalties rather than a 
philosophy. Some of Burke's ideas predated his affiliation 
with the Rockingham Whigs. Burke supported the prominence 
of the aristocracy and opposed the rise of democracy. He 
believed in Providence and rejected rationalism. However, 
Burke's predispositions became sophisticated commitments 
only as a result of his practical association with the 
Rockingham camp
Cone oversimplified some issues and misunderstood 
others. For example, he offered as one proof of Burke's 
essentially political orientation his frequent appeals to 
expediency. Cone thus made the mistake of confusing
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prudence with lack of principle. He also crippled his 
argument that Burke's criticisms of the French Revolution, 
which railed against French lack of prudence, represented a 
second career. Still, Cone's arguments did not ignore, as 
other writers did, the historical context. Instead Cone 
erred in drawing a false dichotomy. He held that Burke had 
been a product of his times rather than a thinker. A proper 
explanation synthesizes rather than dichotomizes the mind 
and the times.143 Nonetheless, Cone serves as a useful 
reminder that the historical context counts.
In summary, Alfred Cobban misinterpreted the historical 
context. He used nineteenth-century terminology to analyze 
eighteenth-century ideology. He thus erroneaously 
identified Burke as a utilitarian. The Natural Law 
theorists, such as Charles Parkin, Peter J. Stanlis, and R. 
R. Fennessy, ignored the historical context. They therefore 
overemphasized a single, albeit critical, aspect of Burkean 
political ideology. Carl B. Cone addressed the historical 
context, but he opposed rather than related this context to 
Burke's political philosophy. Burke's ideas remained 
historically disembodied. The following chapters will 
provide an historical context for eighteenth-century 
political philosophy and locate Burke's place within that 
context.
CHAPTER 3
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EDMUND BURKE'S TRADITIONALISM
Civil war and revolution troubled the seventeenth 
century. The ensuing debate regarding the legitimation of 
political authority haunted political thinkers for 
centuries, Edmund Burke among them. The doctrine of the 
ancient constitution played a vital role in their debate. 
This doctrine asserted that English law had remained 
essentially unchanged since pre-Conquest times.^ Thus, 
it appealed to historical continuity as the basis of 
political authority.
The doctrine of the ancient constitution rested upon 
the common law habit of thinking that characterized English 
jurisprudence. The English, who considered common law the 
basic law of England, held that all common law derived from 
custom. Thus, custom related directly to the foundations of 
authority. Custom relied on usage and experience, on the 
presumption that it had been tested in innumerable 
situations and found worthy and useful. Its origins were
14Fiimmemorial, that is, without conscious beginnings. But 
there were two logically distinct yet intertwined 
implications of custom. Custom could be understood, on the 
one hand, as adaptive, as ever-changing, as the product of 
an unceasing process that embodied a wisdom beyond that any
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one individual could attain. On the other hand., it could be 
understood as timeless, as reflecting a wisdom that reached 
across the centuries and remained ever the same. Custom 
could be understood, then, as both ever-changing and ever 
the same, as at once adaptive and eternal.146
Common law lawyers developed the habit of appealing to 
antiquity. They maintained a convention that the law had 
always been as it was, that it was timeless. They claimed 
that statutes merely declared immemorial custom. The 
wording of statutes, in fact, asserted this claim. The myth 
of timeless immemoria1ity constituted a law's justification 
and claim to authority. Ultimately, however, common law 
lawyers came to believe their myth; the doctrine of the 
ancient constitution was born. The claim, here, is that 
Edmund Burke's traditionalism constituted a revival of the 
suppressed notion of custom as adaptive, continuous 
development.
In medieval times, people tended to believe that only 
the universal was truly rational. The particular and the 
contingent were either ignored or denied. Social and legal 
norms were thought to be based either upon reason, with its 
appeal to timeless universals, or upon experience, with its 
foundation in tradition and its dogmatic assertion that 
something had worked before. Neither norm provided means 
for understanding or directing change.147
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In England, the basic law was common law. In the
latter half of the sixteenth century, a hardening of common
law thinking began to occur. English lawyers increasingly
emphasised the continuity of laws with the English past.
English law became less open to any medieval appeal to
universal implications and tended, instead, to emphasize the
local manifestations of immemorial customs.*4®
A hierarchical image of authority and kingship
coexisted with this image of English law as a heritage of
customs. Society was thought to be composed of degrees or
ranks and the elements of society to be linked one to the
other in a descending chain. The two images of custom and
degree were not outwardly in conflict. The English people
certainly maintained a religious veneration towards both
modes of envisaging the political community. And it was
possible to argue that these images were united: the
descending authority of degree interacted with the ascending
liberty and right of consultation inherent in custom. Yet,
a kingship based on degree demanded only obedience of its
subjects whereas custom posited "a fellowship of experience"
and subjects capable of generating customs.*4̂  The appeal
of common law to custom implied a claim of uniqueness and
autonomy, a claim that the English "were not and they had
ISOnever been, anything which was not of their own making. 111 u 
In 1603, the Stuart James I became king of England. 
James, unlike his Tudor predecessors, had little sympathy
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for English traditions and was committed to an absolutist.
divine right monarchy. T h u s ,.James's reign exposed the
tension that had always potentially existed between degree
and custom. James clashed with Parliament, a body whose
members had been trained in the common law. Parliament
feared James was claiming that the customs and privileges in
the common law were derived from the royal will. Thus,
Parliament's inevitable disagreements with the monarchy over
religious and economic principles assumed, under James's
strict declarations of divine right and assertions of
prerogative, a constitutional importance. The seeds had
been planted for the doctrinal struggle that would emerge
over the next century and a half between the authority of an
ancient constitution and that of a sovereign.
Sir Edward Coke, the chief justice of the King's Bench
during the reign of James I, rebuked the king in the name of
the ancient constitution. This doctrine based its appeal in
1*)\usage, rather than in a rationalization of principles.
It claimed that the common law, the constitution, and
Parliament had remained essentially unchanged since pre-
Conquest times, and it rested on three assumptions: (1) all
English law was common law; (2) common law was custom that
had originated in usages of the people and subsequently been
declared and applied in the courts; and (3) all custom was 
1 S?immemorial. 6 Thus, law was immemorial, and a 
declaration of law was also a declaration of
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iimmemoria1ity. Coke recognized that the law was also
judge-made and adaptive, but he placed emphasis on the
notion that judge-made law was "only a sophistication and
extension of the idea of c u s t o m . B o t h  a habit of
common law thinking and an interest in keeping the ancient
constitution immune from the king's prerogatives encouraged
Coke to solidify common law assumptions. Coke argued that
the wording of statutes, that invariably asserted a basis in
immemorial custom, was acceptable historical proof of a
custom's immemoriality. The convenient pretense that custom
was timeless thus became an assertion of historical truth,
while the adaptive aspect of custom was suppressed.
The Civil War in England disrupted the scheme of
authority and challenged the appeal to traditional
legitimation. Nonetheless, while some radicals opted to
seek the foundations of authority in a godly or in a natural
appeal to the good of the people, others remained
1 ssconservatively committed to a traditional o r d e r . T h o u g h
all the rebels participated in a radical criticism of
existing society, the conservative traditionalists
maintained it was the king who was the i n n o v a t o r . T h e y
appealed to ancient, b u t .now lost, Anglo-Saxon liberties in
i wineed of restoration.
Interregnum leadership continued the appeal to the 
ancient constitution. Parliament had, in fact, arrogated 
sovereign power to itself. In their attempt to, at once.
justify and deny this assumption of sovereign power. 
Parliamentary leaders made two claims: (1) Parliament had
not created the immemorial constitution, but instead had 
merely defined it; and (2) Parliament could legitimately do 
what was necessary in order to defend the ancient
ICOconstitution, 0 The notion of immemorial custom had thus 
shifted in meaning again. Immemorial now meant, 
essentially, sovereign. The medieval rationalist concept of 
immanent, unmade, universa 1, natural law had disappeared 
completely. Further, less reference was made to the 
antiquity of law. Increasingly, appeals were framed in 
terms of the antiquity of Parliament. Immemoriality of law 
had become, however disguised and uncompleted, parliamentary 
sovereignty. Ancient custom now connoted Parliamentary 
immemoriality and, if Parliament was immemorial, it was 
sovereign. The danger in this compression of the concept of 
custom, however, was that neither the common law nor the 
constitution nor Parliament were immemorial. Though it had 
been forgotten, common law had predominately regulated the 
tenure of land, and it had presupposed the feudal and 
military tenures imported by the Normans. - And, if 
Parliament was not immemorial, then it was not sovereign, 
and he who had created Parliament must be sovereign.
The first person to assemble damning evidence against 
the ancient constitution was Sir Henry Spelman. Spelman had 
no political motives for his research. He was simply a
scholar who. In the 1620s, wrote a feudal history of 
England. His work remained unpublished until the 1660s, and 
no political use was made of his findings until the 
Exclusion Crisis in 1679. In his history, Spelman rejected 
the notion of the timeless, immemorial constitution. He 
held that the House of Commons had emerged gradually as 
feudalism and vassalage had ended. Thus institutions, 
especially Parliament, had to be reinterpreted in the light 
of the feudum.1*̂  Spelman also gathered evidence that 
could be used to damage the notion of custom as continuous 
development. Custom was the result of "a series of 
influences of diverse origins," rather than adaptation to 
purely local circumstances.1̂
James Harrington published his major work, Oceana, in 
1656. In this work, Harrington substituted for Spelman's 
gradual decline of feudalism its virtually sudden overthrow 
by Tudor legislation. Harrington offered an agrarian 
version of the degenerative Polybian cycle by anchoring 
historical change in the distribution of property.
According to Harrington, property conferred independence, 
and power was stably distributed only if it did not encroach 
on the independence of property. Government instability 
occurred when the distribution of authority was not properly 
related to the distribution of property that should 
determine it. Harrington rejected the ancient constitution 
as an ideal Gothic balance, now lost and in need of
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restoration. Instead, Harrington saw in the English past an 
inherently unstable limited monarchy characterized by a 
perpetual struggle between king and nobles. Harrington also 
rejected the ancient constitution as an inheritance of 
tradition. Change was not transmitted linearly, but rather 
occurred cyclically. However, Harrington also believed that 
the recent widespread emergence of English freeholders had 
made possible an escape from the cyclical rise and fall of 
unstable governments. The English had the opportunity to 
create a stable mixed republic that would be in accord with 
the distribution of property
Neither Spelman nor Harrington thought to use their 
historical analyses to attack Parliamentary authority.
Other Interregnum writers, however, specifically used the 
feudal ization of English history to refute the immemoriality 
of Parliament and to establish the king's authority. Thomas 
Hobbes, who published Leviathan in 1651, offered a royalist 
apology that used both reason and history as arguments for 
monarchical sovereignty. Law. Hobbes argued, could never be 
derived simply from custom, as Coke had maintained. Custom 
had no binding force. As an accumulation of experience and 
tradition, it could only approach certainty and 
necessity.1̂  Custom could never command. Only reason or a 
sovereign could compel obedience. Reason impelled men to 
establish society when they discovered the futility of their 
independence.*^ Then, a sovereign was a logical
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necessity. Every law had to have originated in someone's 
will, and that someone had to have had sovereignty. In the 
feudal past, the king had been a hereditary suzerain. Thus 
the king must have been this sovereign, without whom the 
society and its laws would have no binding force. Both 
reason and history entitled the king to homage.
Hobbes's royalist defense did not entirely satisfy 
royalist adherents. Hobbes had asserted a Conquest, and 
such a disturbance in continuity could damage royal as well 
as parliamentary claims. Further, most Interregnum 
royalists wished to steer clear of an authority that relied 
on consent for its foundation and brute strength for its 
enforcement. They envisaged a paternal rather than a 
contractual monarch whose authority was "intelligible to 
reason though independent of human consent.1̂
Sir Robert Filmer and William Prynne both used feudal 
history to attack Parliament and thereby strengthen royal 
authority. They held that the House of Commons was no. older 
than King Henry VII's reign. Filmer, an Interregnum writer 
republished posthumously in 1680 during the Exclusion 
Crisis, asserted a doctrine of sovereignty. He simply 
argued that, since Commons clearly was not immemorial, a 
king's will had originally established it. Parliament was 
thus subordinate to will. Prynne, on the other hand, argued 
for Parliament's subordination to- law. Prynne wished to 
discredit the notion of consent of the governed, but he
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could not embrace a doctrine of sovereignty. Prynne
therefore appealed to an immemorial constitution, as the
case for the ancient constitution could also be a case for 
1 f\lthe crown. He claimed that, while the king and lords
were immemorial. Commons was not. Thus, as Parliament was
not immemorial, it was subordinate.
Another Interregnum defense of the crown came from Sir
Matthew Hale. Hale devised a skeptical traditionalist
position similar to that which Edmund Burke would adopt a
century later. His defense involved upholding the common
law during the Protectorate. Hale revived the idea of law
as adaptive custom and stressed the importance of
continuity. Against Hobbes, Hale argued that the rules of
law could never be an exact science. Experience, not
reason, had to serve as the guide and, even then, the
infinite complexities of society prevented any certainty in 
Iprediction. Common law was the fruit of a process "in
which every moment (was) unique and part of a continuous
flow of emergencies." 1̂  Accumulated experience provided
the only means of judging, then refining, that process. The
17(1law was ultimately inscrutable— to reason or to history.
All that could be seen in any custom was the net result of 
experiences that had been tested and shaped in concrete 
situations that, no longer existed. All one could know of 
the past was that it was, at once, unlike the present, but 
continuous with it. Law thus was refined on the presumption
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of continuity, and both the strength and the validity of law 
rested upon that continuity.171
Three changes in the presentation of English politics 
occurred with the Restoration of the monarchy and the House 
of Lords in 1660. First, messianic prophecy as a scheme of 
explanation ceased to have any central importance. England 
opted for a less prophetic, more rational form of religion. 
Millennial projections, to the extent, that they retained 
explanatory viability, survived as a belief in the rational 
and scientific perfection of society.17̂ Second, the 
paradigm of mixed government gained ground on that of mixed 
monarchy as the predominant explanation for the way in which 
elements in society were related to each other. That is, 
elements were now increasingly envisaged as balanced against
17*5each other rather than as ranked in a descending chain. 
Third, the Restoration was legitimized by an appeal to the 
ancient constitution and a revival of the notion of the 
immemorial continuities of custom.17*1 The English could 
think of themselves, once again, as a traditional society.
Two Whig arguments began developing in the 1670s: one,
to be explored in the next chapter, expressed concern over 
patronage and other modern developments in government: the 
other involved a struggle over sovereignty. This latter 
controversy reached its zenith in 1680 during the Exclusion 
Crisis when the Royalist Tory Dr. Robert Brady and the 
Parliamentarian Whig William Petyt debated the antiquity of
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Commons. Sir Robert Filmer's feudal history of England had 
been republished in 1680. Royalist advocates quickly seized 
upon the absolutist implications in Filmer's claim that the 
constitution was a creation of the king's will. -They argued 
that Filmer's history demonstrated that the constitution was 
not immemorial but was. instead, the result of royal action 
and social change. Against this, the Whigs offered an 
antifeudal polemic that asserted the continuity of 
representative government and Parliament's right to a share 
in legislative sovereignty.
The argument between Brady and Petyt concerned 
sovereignty, rather than the validity of appeals to the 
past. The Tories desired, not to place the monarch above 
custom or to abandon antiquity, but to establish prerogative 
and patriarchal government. What Petyt maintained and Brady 
sought to deny was the formal distribution of powers in the 
government and Parliament's role in the exercise of 
legislative sovereignty. Feudal history demonstrated, the 
Tories argued, that the government was not ancient, 
balanced, and changeable only in the form of decay. Rather, 
it was the result of complex processes and of the actions of 
past kings and parliaments that had responded to the needs 
of the moment. The Tories' position differed from Sir 
Matthew Hale's only in their lack of skepticism; they 
claimed, contrary to Hale, that knowledge of historical 
processes was possible. Their disagreement with Whig
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parliamentarians thus did not directly concern the relevance 
of the past to the present but, rather, the location of
*7<jsovereignty /
John Locke responded to Filmer's republished history in
Two Treatises, written in the early 1680s.171> Locke's
arguments appealed to consensual rather than parliamentary
authority against the monarch and displayed a rationalist
177indifference to the p a s t . ” Locke eschewed the appeal to 
immemorial custom and chose to ground his attack against 
patriarchal authority in unchanging reason and nature. 
Continuity was irrelevant; if government failed to protect 
the lives, rights, and estates of its subjects, it could be 
legitimately overthrown. However, Locke's arguments did not 
enter into the Brady controversy. His Two Treatises 
remained unpublished until '1689. In addition, his 
arguments, when they were written, constituted an extremely 
radical attack. In 1680, revolution connoted, for most 
people, only the horrors of anarchy and civil war. A 
primary concern of L o c k e ’s in the Second Treatise had been 
to dampen this dread, to demonstrate that a dissolution of
1 70government did not entail a dissolution of society.
However, only after the experiences of 1689 could the 
overthrow of government seem rational, calm, natural, 
orderly, peaceful, and glorious.179 Additionally, in a . 
customary, traditional society, against a conservative 
maintenance of the present, rebellion tends to be
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i soreactionary, a longing to return to an idealized past. u 
The political norm is located in the past; history is 
interpreted as a decline from that norm. Moreover, the 
tendency in England at that time to see government as a 
balance encouraged a reactionary rather than a radical 
response. A balance could only degenerate. Original 
principles thus had to be maintained.181 Locke was 
irrelevant to political argument in the Brady controversy 
both because his arguments were not, in fact, read, and 
because, if they had been, Locke was probably too radical to 
have had any widespread appeal. Thus the debate over 
patriarchs 1 ism remained rooted in the debate over the feudal 
past.
With the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9. the Whigs 
gained hegemony. Their triumph meant the suppression, for a 
time, of Tory feudal history and the ascendancy of ancient 
constitutionalism. The Whigs claimed that James II's 
removal and his replacement by the kingship of William and 
Mary had not been a dissolution of government.188 
Traditional institutions retained their authority. James II 
had violated the ancient constitution, and his removal and 
replacement could be justified by reference to known 
law.188 Thus, the appeal to common law and precedent 
remained basic to official thought, though the appeal 
enshrined an immemorial ancient constitution rather than 
adaptive custom.
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The Tories maintained, on the other hand, that the
ancient constitution had been set aside. The Tories
resurrected the de facto theory developed during England's
Civil War in the 1640s. They held that the kingship of
William and Mary, while not initially lawful, might now,
I84after the fact, be accepted as legitimate. The new 
kingship was justified not by right, but by necessity.
The Revolution was an emergency action that had established 
no precedent.
John L o c k e 's arguments remained peripheral to both the 
Whig and Tory justifications. Locke wrote of a dissolution 
of government and thus placed himself to the left of 
mainstream Whig claims that no such dissolution of 
government occurred. Whig officialdom preferred an appeal 
to historical continuity and judged Locke's appeal to nature 
unnecessary. Tory theorists agreed with Locke that there 
had been a dissolution of government. However, the Tories 
sought to understand legitimacy under the conditions of a 
collapse of authority. Locke had argued in Two Treatises 
that a dissolution of government could happen in ways that 
left society and authority intact.1®*’ Arguments of 
legitimacy still centered on an ancient constitution, not a 
contractual one.
The Whig regime that emerged after the Glorious 
Revolution was aristocratic and dependent on the management 
of a system of patronage, public credit, military growth.
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and imperial expansion. Opposition developed against this 
innovative, expansive government of influence and new money. 
An amalgam of Old Whig commonwealthmen and Tory gentry 
offered a fundamentalist defense. Against the Whig appeal 
to the immemorial constitution, the opposition offered an 
alternative vision of antiquity.*®7 They antithesized the 
immemorial House of Commons and the new government fueled by 
patronage and credit and called for a return to original 
principles. Thus a "fermenting" debate developed in the 
quarter century following the Glorious Revolution between 
the conservative defenders of the Whig aristocratic regime
1 flfland its reactionary commonwealth and country critics. 0
By 1730, the Tory and Whig positions of 1680 had been 
reversed. In 1680, the Whigs promoted the ancient 
constitution. Parliament's prestige was enhanced if its 
roots were in the past. The Tories, hoping to demonstrate 
that Parliament was derivative of the Crown, put forward a 
feudal interpretation of history. By 1730, however, the 
Whigs held power, and Parliamentary sovereignty was no 
longer seriously challenged. The Tories now embraced the 
immemorial ancient constitution, hoping to dim the present
i OQby brightening the past. ’ They wrote of an idealized 
Gothic balance that the Whig regime had subverted. The 
Whigs responded by rejecting the reference to antiquity and 
offering a pragmatic, empirical analysis. First, they 
espoused a more persuasive version of history. Dr. Robert
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Brady's feudal interpretation. They now claimed that the 
past was feudal, not free. Liberty and the balanced
1 Qftconstitution were modern, not ancient. ™  Their regime 
represented the highest realization of freedom, not its
1 Q1subversion. Second, they denied that the past had any
authority over the present. There were no principles to
return to. The present was merely "a series of steps to an
1Q?imagined future."1̂  Things were better now than they had 
b e e n .
By the 1770s, two pressures strained the Whig 
presentist, empirical defense. The first strain came from 
the opposition to the Whig oligarchy. The agrarian ideal of 
propertied independence had slowly declined, and thus a
1radical Lockean philosophy finally made its appearance. J
In its original form, Lockean doctrine did not imply a
constitutional government. It merely advocated “a
prerogative exercised for the good of the people and
tempered by the threat of dissolution."^4 Now,, a century
later, opposition radicals further developed Lockean
premises and reasoned that, if people originated the
government, then they might resume power to reform a
repressive or corrupt government. The opposition
understanding of government thus began a slide from a polity
of independent powers towards a populist, democratic polity
19Sin which sovereignty resided with the popular will.
Rights were founded in reason, in nature, not in
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inheritance. Thus, the Lockean indifference to the past, 
earlier a conservative, though peripheral, defense of the 
Glorious Revolution and the Whig regime, now became a basis 
for attacking Whig aristocratic government. Whig modernism 
and rejection of antiquity defended less effectively against 
this rationalist adversary.
The second strain emerged within the Whig regime 
itself. George III and his ministers aroused resentment 
among some Whig aristocratic politicians. Those aristocrats 
included in George Ill's ministry continued the politics of 
patronage and credit that had made government possible since 
before 1714. However, those aristocrats out of office 
interpreted, however incorrectly, George Ill's actions as 
successful attempts to enlarge royal prerogative. 1̂  They 
believed that crown influence was destroying the independent 
capacity of the aristocracy and subjecting their order to 
royal control. Thus the Whig oligarchy was fragmenting and, 
for those out of office, ancient constitutionalism appeared 
appealing and appropriate for their needs. Whig arguments 
against royal encroachment began to replace the defense of 
modernity in some aristocratic circles. The Whig regime 
needed defense, then, against both radical rationalists and 
reactionary ancient constitutionalists. The stage was now 
set for Edmund Burke. He responded to opposition attacks 
with a philosophy of skeptical traditionalism.
Much of Burke's traditionalism originated in his
8 3
acceptance of an objective divine order. Burke insisted on 
the inferiority, fa 11ib i 1ity and feebleness of human plans. 
"There is," he wrote, "by the essential fundamental 
Constitution of things a radical infirmity in all human 
c o n t r i v a n c e s . " ^  Burke thus approved of only cautious 
reform and always hesitated to tamper with things as they 
existed. He conceived of society as an infinitely complex, 
yet harmoniously composed, organic whole. "The diversified 
but connected fabric of universal justice," he wrote, "is
i gowell cramped and bolted together in all its parts."170 
Consequently he believed in divinely appointed stations in 
life and emphasized reciprocal bonds of duty over individual 
assertions of right. "The situation of man is the preceptor
1 QQof his duty."17 Even Burke's classical economic 
liberalism owed more to Aquinas than to Smith, to his belief 
in Providence than to his scientific reasoning about an 
"invisible hand." He opposed the "zealots of the sect of 
regulation" and acknowledged "the benign and wise Disposer 
of all things, who obliges men, whether they will or not, in 
pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the general 
good with their own individual s u c c e s s . A l l  these 
aspects of Burke's philosophy can be attributed to his 
belief in a divine order, immune to the effects of and 
superior to human design.
The concept of universal order and divine law did not 
explain local diversity and individual variety. Political
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reasoning had to allow more premises than medieval Natural
Law provided. Thus men believed that their laws and customs
bridged the gap between the particular and the universal.
Common law attempted to approximate God's law. Though it.
of course., remained subordinate to higher divine principles
of justice, still it enabled local adaptation. Thus
circumstances had to be considered. So too did experience
for, though the laws of men participated in human
imperfection, they also profited from divine guidance.
Burke's traditionalism, which appealed to common as well as
to Natural Law, included both a practical recognition of
situational differences and a conservative tendency to rely
on prescriptive title and presumptive knowledge.
Though Burke mistrusted unaided reason and respected
custom, he never granted absolute authority to the past.
Burke believed that change was progressive, that the
situation of man improved over time. He never idealized the
past. Primitive Anglo-Saxon government, he said, existed in
9f)1"pristine rudeness . "4W1 Burke always admitted the 
possibility of reform. But he likewise always wished to 
temper its scope. Caution, not aversion, characterized 
Burke's attitude towards change.
Of course, Burke also exhibited typically Whig 
attitudes. By 1764, he had begun his association with the 
Rockingham Whigs. Under their tutelage he assimilated the 
Whig philosophy— the pragmatic, empirical, presentist habit
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of reasoning that characterized the powerful descendants of 
Robert Walpole. The Whig appeal to experience, with its 
rejection of abstractions, its acknowledgement of complexity 
and of infinite diversity, and its practical aspiration 
towards present progress rather than past or future 
perfection, fit comfortably with Burke's early training and 
his notions of Providential g u i d a n c e . ^  But Whig 
practicality, rather than tending to free Burke from frozen 
principles, instead worked to enforce his tendency towards 
caution. In 1770 he wrote to his close boyhood friend:
"All that wise men ever aim at is to keep things from coming 
to the worst. Burke never fully embraced the dynamism
implicit in Whig modernism.
Opposition to the government, then, came from two 
sources in the 1770s. First, radical dissidents criticized 
the Whig aristocratic, r e g i m e . Using Lockean arguments, 
these critics argued that, since government should be 
exercised for the good of the people, the people had a right 
to resume power to reform government. Their arguments, in 
effect, located sovereignty in the popular will and founded 
rights in reason and nature rather than in property and 
inheritance. In the name of the popular will, these 
radicals demanded reform of representation in the House of 
Commons. Their demand for reform of representation made 
them natural, if temporary, allies of country dissidents who 
cherished ranked society and propertied independence and
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favored reform of representation on these grounds. These 
country sentiments attracted the Whig aristocrats who had 
been excluded from government office. The Whig aristocrats 
provided the second source of government opposition. They 
charged that the crown, through its influence, subverted the 
independent capacity of the aristocracy to associate. The 
crown was upsetting the ancient balance of orders that 
properly formed the British government. Country reformers 
appealed to the paradigm of mixed government rather than to 
a doctrine of popular sovereignty. Good government was 
insured by counterbalancing restraints rather than by 
reference to the popular will.
Edmund Burke was a spokesman for the aristocratic 
position. He employed the model of mixed government in his 
arguments, and he spent well over a decade trying to curb 
royal infringement. He justified party government and his 
economical reform of 1780 as necessary means for preventing 
improper crown influence. But Burke's opposition to 
government was never fundamental in nature. He fervently 
believed himself to be an ardent supporter of British 
government. Thus, while he associated with aristocratic 
opposition and even supported some popular movements, he 
remained uncomfortable in any alliance with either 
reactionary or radical dissidents.
Burke agreed with his radical allies that government 
rested upon a contract between rulers and ruled whereby the
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rulers were charged to promote the general good of the 
p e o p l e . 204 He allowed the possibility of popular
one,intervention. He even admitted the possibility of
r e v o l u t i o n . 0 But he never accepted popular sovereignty.
His model remained that of mixed government, and he always
?fi7approached change cautiously.6
Additionally, Burke always qualified his support of 
popular causes. Although he supported the seating of the 
radical John Wilkes as a Member of Parliament from 
Middlesex, he remained aloof from Wilkes and his followers. 
Burke wrote regarding Wilkes: "He is not ours; and if he
were, is little to be trusted."200 Likewise, in the 
controversy with his Bristol constituents over the nature of 
representation, Burke always rejected the radical notion 
that electors might instruct their representatives regarding 
their vote. He admitted that a representative should listen 
to popular sentiments, but he insisted that Members of 
Parliament remained independent of popular will in their 
judgments.200 Burke never fully endorsed popular demands.
Burke also, however, became increasingly uncomfortable 
with the reactionary potential in the aristocratic appeal to 
mixed government. This appeal might be used, to reject any 
modern accommodation, and Burke, though cautious by nature 
and certainly wary of democratic pressures, never opposed 
progress or reform. Thus the battle to conserve present 
arrangements had to be fought on two fronts. To do this.
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Burke expounded his fully developed conservative ideology of 
skeptical traditionalism in 1782.
Burke explicitly recognized that the demand for reform 
came from two separate, even irreconcilable, sources. In 
his "Speech on a Motion Made in the House of Commons, the 
7th of May 1782, for a Committee to Inquire into the State 
of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament," he 
argued against both of the reform positions. The majority 
of reformers argued on the basis of right, the claim that 
"the meanest petitioner, the most gross and ignorant, is as
oi ogood as the b e s t . " Individuals possessed the right of
self-government, either personally or through their
representatives, and such representatives properly comprised
Commons. Commons thus must represent individuals rather
than interests. "Men as men are individuals, and nothing 
711else." On these grounds, representation in Commons was
unfairly, inequitably distributed and in need of reform.
The other set of reformers rejected the notion of personal
representation and argued instead on the basis of the good
of the community. The constitution, according to these
reformers, had degenerated from and should be restored to
its original principles.
Burke countered the Lockean appeal to the rights of man
71 7with a traditionalist appeal to precedent. “  Appeals to 
reason or nature contained several errors and dangers that 
Burke wished to expose and dismiss. First, constitutional
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theory did not exist prior to society and its institutions: 
rather it had been distilled from society's constitutional 
i n h e r i t a n c e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  principles had been 
inferred from, e x p e r i e n c e . Experience, not reason, had 
provided the test of society's conventions and institutions. 
The constitution and societal institutions had originated, 
not in consent, but in a succession of unique events.
Second, reason yielded only universal principles. It was 
utterly unable to respond to local character or unique 
events. It could not test the applicability of a rule to 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^  Only traditionalist reliance on usage 
and prudence provided sound g u i d e s . T h i r d ,  an appeal to 
the rights of man as the foundation of government could 
delegitimate any government. A rational or natural basis 
could never be stable. Finally, rational or natural 
appeals rejected inheritance. Rather than treasuring 
accumulated experience, single individuals made the past 
answerable to vague and general principles. Disdain for 
inheritance exposed the dangerous and foolish pride that was 
inherent in the attachment to rational or natural appeals. 
Traditionalism, on the other hand, contained an 
understanding of and respect for the complexity of the world 
and its processes. Accumulated experience, transmitted 
through inheritance, represented, not an obstacle to 
progress, but man's greatest asset and the basis for all 
stable change. Lockean notions of individual personal
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representation were not only inapplicable but also inferior 
to British principles of government.
Against the reactionary ancient constitutionalists who
wished to reverse modern adaptations and return to original
principles, Burke adopted a skeptical attitude. In typical
Whig fashion, he argued that there were no original
principles from which the constitution had presently
degenerated. Principles had been deduced from the
operations of government, not vice v e r s a .^  Since
principles explained rather than directed experience,
questions regarding government became questions of
expediency, of the "good for the community, and good for
every individual in it."^® By this standard of
expediency, the traditional Whig defense against reactionary
fundamentalism, the performance of the constitution, not the
promise of speculators, had to serve as criteria. And the
91QBritish constitution functioned well. *
Burke reached back toward seventeenth-century common 
law thinking and revived the adaptive aspect of custom. 
Immemorial did not necessarily mean static and unchanging. 
Alternatively, it could mean that a custom's origin was 
unknowable, that its beginning could not be found in a 
single moment. Instead of appealing to modernity, in 
typical Whig fashion, Burke appealed to an immemorial 
constitution. This appeal did not represent, however, a 
call to preserve or return to original principles. Burke
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accepted change. His immemorial constitution represented 
custom as perpetually adaptable and always up-to-date, as 
capable of accommodating new situations, yet as still 
anchored in the past. History was an unceasing, infinitely 
complex process. Man's knowledge of that process was rooted 
in nothing more than experience and the presumption of 
continuity with the past. The problem with ancient 
constitutionalism had not been its reverence for the past, 
but rather its call to return to original principles. There 
were no original principles to return to. No one could 
reconstruct the p a s t .221 Thus Burke opposed his 
traditionalist philosophy to the radical claims regarding 
the rights of man, and he opposed a skeptical Whig reliance 
on adaptive experience to reactionary yearnings for 
conformity with original principle.
Burke's traditionalism had been part of his orientation
from the beginning. His skepticism was new. In 1759, he
criticized the reliance on presumptive knowledge and
adaptive custom that characterized Chief Justice Hale's
philosophy. He criticized Hale's approach of confining
legal research and limiting it to "a narrow and inglorious
s tudy."222 However, in 1782. Burke was willing to accept the
presumption of continuity and to forego the search for a
history of the law. He admitted the beginnings of
000government were inevitably o b s c u r e . And he maintained 
that continuity with the past could be presumed.224 Burke's
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mature conservatism was thus formed and acknowledged by 
1782. The constitution required only preservation. It did 
not fail to disregard any natural rights; it had not.fallen 
away from any original principles. It was wonderfully 
formed to lead men forward. Neither abstract deduction nor 
historical research could improve on the adaptive process 
already in place.
The original conservative defense of the Whig 
aristocracy had answered the reactionary, fundamentalist 
dedication to original principles with a pragmatic 
insistence that the present was better than the past. The 
conservative position then became vulnerable to claims made 
on behalf of rationally-deduced principles. Burke's 
skeptical traditionalism answered the rationalist opposition 
and thus shored up the conservative defense. To what 
extent, then, did Burke's traditionalism alter former 
conservative arguments? First, Burke's approach seemed to 
directly contradict the u n h i storica1 authority argued by 
earlier conservatives. However, both theories were designed 
to authorize existing arrangements. Pragmatic 
conservatives, though denying the relevance of the past, 
acted to institute continuity. Traditionalists simply 
presumed continuity. Thus, earlier conservatives relied on 
necessity, Burkean conservatives on precedent, but both-
11V\Iconcerned themselves with justification of the present. 
Second, though both theories upheld present arrangements.
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the pragmatic conservatives embraced modernity. They 
conceived of their order as progressive and dynamic. Burke 
and his followers, on the other hand, were rather more 
cautious about the processes of change. Their reverence 
towards the past, towards precedent and custom, resulted in 
a prudential attitude towards c h a n g e . ^  Burkean 
conservatives tempered the belief in progress with an 
organic view that united past and future generations to the 
present and placed the predictable manipulation of the 
processes of history beyond the capacity of single 
individuals. Now conservatives could defend present 
institutions against the future as well as against the past.
CHAPTER 4
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EDMUND BURKE'S WHIGGISM
In examining Burkean ideology, it is important to 
remember that, while Burke was a traditionalist, he was also 
a Whig. The eighteenth-century Whigs envisaged themselves 
in alliance with the forces of modernity. They were 
progressive and dynamic, and Burke identified with them.
Thus an examination of Burkean ideology must either 
reconcile or account for any disparity between Burke's 
traditionalism and his Whiggism. Such an account requires a 
broader exploration of the ideological universe available in 
the eighteenth century.
In the seventeenth century, English political discourse 
was law-centered. Languages of hierarchy and custom 
constituted the terms by which subjects understood their 
rights and duties. During the seventeenth century, however, 
another way to understand society and government entered to 
compete with the jurisprudential mode. The English began 
increasingly to think of their society in classical, civic 
humanist terms. This chapter will describe this classical 
language and its development through the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. It will reveal the effect of this 
classical language on Burke's philosophy, relate this 
language to B u r k e ’s Whiggism. and show how Burke engineered
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a shift in this language.
The classical language posited a fresh vision of man as
an inherently political creature. Against the medieval,
Christian denial of the possibility of secular fulfillment,
the classical ideal positively asserted that men should
777involve themselves in this world/'1 Men rose to their 
full stature, this ideal assumed, only through participation 
in the civic life of their community. By their nature, men 
were meant to be, not simply subjects, but citizens.
This classical model differed from and even 
contradicted the juristic model. The two models proposed 
different values, foresaw different problems, and suggested 
different strategies for a c t i o n . T h e  law-centered 
language required from society only private protection for 
the individual. Liberty meant autonomy, the freedom to 
practice one's own affairs. The law afforded the subject 
certain rights and immunities for that pursuit; the 
magistrate enforced the law. Private and public spheres 
were separate. The individual defined himself by his rights 
to things. His pursuit of a moral, good life required only 
the absence of corruption. The classical paradigm required 
more. The individual fulfilled himself through 
participation in the community. Private rights were not 
opposed to public sovereignty. Instead, the notion of civic 
participation dissolved the dichotomy between liberty and
authority. Liberty meant freedom from constraints upon
public participation. The individual defined himself by h
actions rather than by his rights. Morality was no longer
private. Now the individual, in order to develop his
positive qualities, had to involve himself actively in his
community. Morality thus became public, political, even 
)7Qi nterdependent.
For his fulfillment, the classical citizen required 
institutional structures that allowed and encouraged his 
involvement. The dilemma for the citizen, then, was that 
his character and personality had become dependent upon 
externals. His capacity to be moral and complete was now
O O f jpoliticized and, hence, vulnerable. A single, 
independent man could not create or ensure the conditions 
his fulfillment. A full, virtuous life depended on 
structures and relationships not totally in his control. 
Thus, the continued existence of institutional structures 
compatible with citizen involvement became a vital 
concern.^1 Government became both an institutional and a 
moral structure, and the language of virtue came to
characterize the classical view as the language of right
IX)characterized the juristic view.
The citizen needed access to his government. That 
requirement, however, implied a certain equality among 
c i t i z e n s . ^  If one group of citizens gained 
disproportionate power, then that group could effectively
deny access to others and thus compromise their citizenship, 
their capacity to be fully themselves. This requirement for 
citizenship of equality meant, then: first, governmental
structures had to be constituted so as to discourage one 
group from acquiring more power than another; and second, 
the citizenry had to be virtuous in the sense that they had 
to seek the common rather than their own individual good in 
order for the possibility of citizenship to p ersist.234
The ancients had suggested that a mixed form of
government was the most stable arrangement for citizens.
Aristotle had taught them that individuals pursued different
interests.233 For the sake of convenience, these
differences had traditionally been characterized as the
differences between the one. the few, and the many. These
differences, in turn, had come to represent the three pure
forms of government— monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.
Each pure form, the ancients believed, inevitably
degenerated due to an excess of its own qualities.236 The
power and unity inherent in a monarchy turned ultimately
into tyranny. The wisdom characteristic of an aristocracy
became, in time, simply division and faction. The virtue of
the many in a democracy declined into anarchy, violence, and
licentiousness. A mixed government, however, might combine
the virtues of the three pure forms and check their
IV)degenerative excesses. All the "simple" forms of 
government were incompatible with the practice of
9 8
citizenship. A mixed government, though, provided both the 
arena of and the stability necessary for political 
part i c i pat i o n .
The classical paradigm of mixed government and the 
virtuous citizen did not enter English political discourse 
fortuitously. Alternative paradigms failed to explain 
events satisfactorily. In 1640, the authority of the king 
was collapsing. Neither the language of hierarchy nor that 
of custom could explain such disruptive change. Thus, in 
1642, in his “Answer to the Nineteen Propositions," the king
TOOaltered the terms of constitutional d e b a t e . In that 
document, the king described the traditional constitution as 
a balance between the three estates of King, Lords, and 
Commons. These estates corresponded to the three pure forms 
of government, respectively monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy, and the king's own office represented but one of
OOQthese estates. Thus the king himself admitted the new 
paradigm of mixed government. Using classical, humanist 
theory, he admitted that he shared power in a balanced 
g o v e r n m e n t .
The language of balance had made its appearance. But 
it did not yet supplant the older languages.^® Classical, 
civic humanist ideology required, as its foundation, 
consciousness of citizenship, of active participation. 
Neither hierarchy nor custom necessitated such consciousness 
and that awareness had to appear before civic humanist
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values could e m e r g e . In addition, other alternatives
existed to explain the breakdown in authority. Men could 
appeal to individual conscience or to pre-determined 
principles that resided either in a pre-civil state of 
nature or in a lost ancient constitution. Their problems 
were the legitimacy of authority and the location of 
allegiance. Neither problem necessarily invoked an image of 
classical citizenship.242
The regicide and assumption of power by rebel forces in
1649 changed this. The army had created this situation.
They had now to explain their own actions as well as to
regularize a d e 1egitimized situation.243 Their actions and
their government could be explained in religious terms.
They could envisage England as an Elect Nation, and maintain
that all human authority was subject to God's author i t y . 244
Or they could explain themselves in secular terms. Both
Hobbes and Harrington made their contributions here. They
objected to the rule of the saints and desired to
?4Sreconstitute authority on secular grounds. Hobbes 
appealed to a pre-civil state of nature and based the 
legitimacy of government on its logical necessity. For 
their self-preservation, men transferred their rights to a 
sovereign. Harrington reached back to classical theory 
regarding cyclical change and explained why the government 
had collapsed and how Englishmen might reconstitute a stable 
government immune to decay.
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James Harrington was the key figure in introducing
classical, humanist ideology into English political and
social awareness. Harrington's classicizing effect was
dual: he introduced a theory of citizenship: and he
explained change as secular, cyclical, and d e g e n e r a t i v e . 246
To generate a theory of citizenship for England, Harrington
borrowed the Machiavellian theory of arms. Machiavelli had
argued that the possession of arms, was crucial to both power
and liberty.247 Harrington then applied this theory to
predominantly agrarian England, with its "common law
understanding of the importance of freehold p r o p e r t y .
Harrington held that the bearing of arms was based on the
possession of property. The freeholder could bear arms; the
vassal could not. The crucial distinction in society, the
basis for power and for individual independence, was that
?4Qbetween vassalage and freehold. Property rendered a 
person capable of autonomy.1' The independent freeholder 
was thus envisaged by Harrington as a classical citizen.
Land supplied the material basis for citizenship. It
enabled a life of leisure and thus the opportunity to
1participate in civic life.
Harrington linked property to historical change. 
Property conferred independence and the capacity to defend 
oneself. Change occurred when the distribution of authority 
was not related to the distribution of property. In such 
cases, either authority would be made to correspond to the
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distribution of property, or property would be redistributed 
according to the distribution of power. English feudal 
government had been inherently unstable, characterized by a 
perpetual struggle between king and nobles. However, most 
of the land in England had now been distributed in non­
dependent tenures. The English thus had a rare opportunity 
to create a stable commonwealth. They could halt the 
degenerative cycle by distributing power to freeholders.
Harrington published Oceana during the Protectorate.
He intended his work to justify an armed republic rather 
than to argue against a return to an ancient 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^  By 1654, most Englishmen accepted the 
return of government by a single person and Parliament.
Most, including Harrington, assumed Parliament would consist 
of two chambers, or Houses. Most, therefore, intended to 
erect a government by three estates. The debate revolved 
around the nature of the second House. Harrington fought 
against establishing an hereditary second House. Harrington 
argued that the ancient peerage had vanished and could not 
be reconstituted. Arms, he reasoned, would be born either 
by freeholders or by professional soldiers; Harrington 
argued fiercely for the former. He proposed, in place of a 
hereditary House of Lords, a Senate, distinguished from a 
Commons by its functions. The old peerage, however, could 
not easily be rejected. The authority of tradition 
bolstered them. Further, if the second House was neither
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hereditary nor armed, It was dependent and thus powerless to 
guarantee the balance necessary in the desired mixed
KAg o v e r n m e n t ,
Ultimately, of course, a hereditary aristocracy was 
restored, though it was changed in the process. The 
restored aristocrats were no longer palace-centered. Now 
they also worked in Parliament.2'’5 Still, the debate 
regarding their restoration had affected the way in which 
the English thought about their government. The victors in 
the debate had appealed to the ancient constitution and 
mixed government as the basis of legitimate British 
government. The opposition, led by Henry Neville, had found 
comfort in Harrington's assurance that a hereditary 
aristocracy was no longer possible and strength in his 
insistence that their government had been unstable. The 
opposition had thus argued their position in Harringtonian 
terms. That is, the debate had been conducted entirely 
within the assumptions of. mixed government. Harrington had 
altered classical ideas of citizenship and cyclical change 
to fit England by making both dependent on property. Though 
Harrington's rejection of the past was incompatible with a 
commitment to an ancient constitution, he had made classical 
ideology, with its wealth of ideas regarding mixed 
government, appropriate for English political thought.
Harringtonian language formed the basis of constitutional 
debate in England for the next c e n t u r y . 2^
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A group of intellectuals, collectively known as the 
n e o - Harringtonians, first modified Harrington's ideas 
regarding the past, then used them to criticize social, 
political, and economic changes occurring in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth c e n t u r i e s . Harrington had 
introduced Machiavellian ideas of citizenship by relating 
the citizen to arms and arms to land. He had utilized 
Polybian theories of cyclical change to analyze the English 
past. To incorporate his ideas and language into the 
mainstream of English political thought, it remained only to 
reconcile Harrington with the ancient constitution, that is, 
to locate the political norm in the past instead of in the
future as Harrington himself had done.
Though classical language lent itself to an analysis of 
corruption, Harrington had largely ignored this notion and 
focused instead on the qualities of independence and 
d e p e n d e n c e . 258 Once his ideas were reconciled with the 
past, however, change came to be understood as entropic. a 
move away from stability. Thus, change was identified as 
corruption in the technical, now uncommon, sense of the term
that identified any decay of an ideal government toward
pc: qinstability as corruption. Further, since Harrington 
had identified the material cause of change, he had rendered 
change intelligible, the result of concrete, understandable 
processes rather than of circumstance or accident.
Therefore, corruption could also suggest avoidable human
defect or a lack of virtue, and the concrete processes of 
change could be identified as movements away from 
virtue. Corruption, and its antithesis virtue, thus 
entered English political discourse as the designation of 
three things: first, corruption signified the decay of
government; second, it identified the cause of that decay as 
the loss of autonomy; third, it referred to individual 
morality, and related the individual personality directly to 
his political environment and capacity for c itizenship.^1 
Corruption and virtue referred both to the political 
conditions necessary to human liberty and morality and to 
the individual capacity for independence and devotion to the 
common good required of citizens if governmental 
disintegration was to be p r e v e n t e d . ^
Since 1660, the direction of governmental affairs had 
been increasingly centered in the ministry as the bridge 
between the branches of government. By 1675, Prime Minister 
Danby had begun an expansion of ministerial influence 
through the creation of a system of patronage, an informal 
distribution of offices that indebted Members of Parliament 
to the ministry and thereby encouraged their cooperation.
In this context, the Earl of Shaftesbury first changed 
Harrington's ideas and used them to object to governmental 
innovations. Shaftesbury believed, with Harrington, that a 
stable government had to rely on a citizen militia and that 
the militia required widespread landed independence as its
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fo u n d ation.^0 Additionally, he objected to the extension 
of ministerial influence. Thus Shaftesbury, first, 
identified patronage as corruption and hence as a threat to 
the balanced constitution. Patronage created dependence and 
so deprived Members of Parliament of the autonomy they 
needed to protect against encroachment. Corruption acquired 
a new meaning here. It signified not simply an imperfection 
in the distribution of power or an infringement on spheres 
of action. It also meant, now, the economic dependence of 
the legislative branch upon the executive, i.e., the 
indirect control of Parliament's decision-making ability 
through corruption. Patronage became here a key to 
understanding British politics; the terms of its analysis 
were the classical and Harringtonian terms that related 
property to personality.*^4 Additionally, opposition 
thought, from Harrington up to the nineteenth century, would 
conceive of mixed government in terms of the independence, 
rather than the interdependence, of its branches, i.e., in 
terms of an "equilibrium among three divided and mutually 
antagonistic branches" rather than as a blend and balance of 
King, Lords, and Commons wherein their virtues were 
heightened while their vices were eliminated. Second. 
Shaftesbury chose to link patronage with the growth of a 
standing army. However, where Harrington had envisaged the 
threat to liberty from a standing army as originating only 
from its use by an unlawful authority, Shaftesbury feared
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its use by a lawful authority. To Shaftesbury, the standing 
army represented additional governmental offices-and thus 
the extension of patronage and the upsetting of the 
constitutional balance. Only a militia, composed of self- 
armed independent landowners, could compatibly exist with a 
stable, mixed government. Third, Shaftesbury held out the 
House of Lords, by virtue of its m e m b e r s ’ capacity for 
landed independence, as the protector of British liberty.
The House of Lords was not. as Harrington had maintained, an 
indication of an unstable, unfree feudal past, but rather a 
necessary part of an ancient balance whose degeneration 
entailed the loss of liberty. The Crown, through 
ministerial influence, now had the means to encroach. It 
was the responsibility of the House of Lords to maintain the
Jfikequilibrium of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e  reconciliation of 
Harrington with the Gothic ancient constitution had thus 
b e g u n .267
Henry Neville, translator of Machiavelli and author of 
Plato Redivivus (1680), completed the reconciliation of 
Harrington with the ancient constitution. Unlike the 
aristocratic Earl of Shaftesbury, Neville was a republican. 
He had led the fight in 1659 against the establishment of a 
hereditary second House. He believed, with Harrington, that 
the balance of power in England had passed to the Commons 
and that constitutional arrangements should reflect this 
cha n g e . 2̂  Following the Restoration, however, he
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reluctantly accepted the crown and peerage and came to 
believe, contrary to Harrington, that a hereditary 
aristocracy could legitimately and stably represent the 
"few" in a mixed republic. In 1680, the Tories were 
attacking the balanced constitution. These apologists for 
crown power denied the immemoriality of Commons in order to 
maintain that the king possessed sovereignty. Neville, 
desiring to protect Commons, sided with Petyt against Brady 
in this controversy and revived Harrington's history. He 
maintained that the ancient Gothic polity had not been 
inherently unstable. The ancient peerage had checked the 
king and people to protect the common good. The decay of 
the ancient constitution had been, in part, a decay of the 
ancient baronage. Thus, patronage had emerged as the 
crown's response to the decline of the baronage and their 
inability to adequately balance King and Commons. In one 
stroke, Neville's revision of Harrington situated the 
political norm in the past, thereby representing historical 
change as decline, and, by linking the rise of patronage 
with the decline of the nobility, provided the historical 
context within which that decline could be identified with 
corruption. 269 Thus, by 1685. most Englishmen understood 
their constitution to be both balanced and ancient and used 
the classical language of virtue to evaluate the health-of
97(1their government. u
The significant event at the close of the seventeenth
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century, in terms of the debates of the eighteenth century.
was not the Glorious Revolution, but rather the Financial
Revolution that occurred in the 1690s. The central problem
for the eighteenth century did not concern right, but virtue
and the "difficulty of finding an acceptable replacement for
it "2/1 jYjen th8 eighteenth century debated questions
regarding patronage, public debt, and standing armies, not
27?the right of resistance to a ruler. Neo-Harringtonian
rather than Lockean ideas provided the basis for an
increased awareness of the changing nature of monetary
re 1 at lonships . 6/
The Financial Revolution was the creation of the Bank
of England in 1694 and the byproduct of England's need to
raise money for her war with F r a n c e . ^  The financial
innovations begun in the 1690s resulted in an ongoing
national debt, that is, a structure of public credit whereby
a large class of investors gambled on and thus produced
state stability and expansion, prosperity, and a political
and commercial empire. A new monied elite of
stockjobbers and placemen appeared who were related to the
government by their dependence upon it. This monied
elite challenged the neo-Harringtonian ideal of the
independent, virtuous citizen and thus rendered exchange
777relationships problematic.6 ' Critics of the emerging Whig 
regime claimed that the regime rested on the twin 
foundations of patronage and credit and that both
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foundations were corrupt.^® For the next century, the
dominant mode of thought was what could be called "political 
economy," the wary recognition of changing commercial and 
financial relations, not only as they related to the 
production of wealth, but also as they affected stability
0 7 Qand v i r t u e .
Men of the seventeenth century had not been entirely
comfortable with trade and market relations. They believed
that men could more easily relinquish their independence if
their wealth consisted of mobile property rather than land.
Owners of mobile property tended more toward specialization
and were exposed more to the temptations of luxury. Thus
they were more likely to hire professionals to govern and to
defend t h e m / 00 Mobile property threatened the health of
society, not because it was marketable, but because it eased
patronage and thus corrupted the government and its 
?R1citizens. Hence, trade relations were suspect. 
Nonetheless, they were not envisaged as necessarily or 
inherently corrupting. They may have eased corruption, but 
they did not logically entail it.
The appearance of speculation and public credit, 
recognized prerequisites of the expanded commerce, 
challenged the paradigm of the virtuous citizen far more 
profoundly than had simple market exchange relationships.
The reliance of government and society upon credit meant the 
reliance of government and society upon a belief and trust
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in the future. None of the traditionally trusted
epistemological foundations provided the basis for such a
belief. Experience, Christian faith, and reason were all
insufficient to predict an expanding and growing commerce.
Such belief could rise only from the imagination and the
passions. 0i The stability of society seemed to depend
upon no more than mere opinion regarding the future.
Commerce, the precondition of credit, emerged as a potential
threat, because it seemed founded upon no more than fantasy.
The stockjobber was feared originally because of his
reliance upon fantasy-based speculation, not because of his
cold, impersonal mechanical r a t i o n a l i t y . ^  Additionally,
the individual as a classical political being was
threatened. Harrington had taught that the foundation of
virtue and personality was material, not spiritual.
984Property provided the basis for personality. But new 
forms of property had appeared. Property relations now 
seemed to rest on fantasy. Property seemed less real, and 
thus the personality itself seemed imaginary, too irrational 
and too limited to be virtuous and capable of autonomous, 
dispassionate political participation. The appearance 
of speculation seemed to entail the emergence of unstable 
p e r s o n a l i t y .
Andrew Fletcher, an old Whig republican, was one of the 
first opposition critics to reveal the ambivalence inherent 
in the neo-Harringtonian opposition position. Fletcher saw
I l l
that commerce had relegated the ideal of armed, civic virtue
to the past. He feared the temptations commerce offered for
specialization and luxury, i.e., for corruption. But he
also understood that, while the past may have been free and
virtuous, it had also been barbaric and superstitious. The
emergence of commerce thus revealed the apparent
incompatibility of liberty and virtue with culture.287
Daniel Defoe, perhaps the first defender of the Whig
order, answered Fletcher. Defoe unequivocally denied the
existence of any ancient liberty and insisted that commerce
created freedom. Using a feudal interpretation, he
characterized the past as uncultivated, violent, and
repressive. In the present, Defoe argued, commerce did not
endanger liberty so long as the individual had
?fifi"parliamentary control of the purse strings. 0 Defoe 
thus reconciled commerce and liberty. However, he failed to
OflQprovide any moral basis for the new commercial order.
The civic participatory ideal was based on an autonomy 
conferred by land, and this mode of land ownership, and 
therefore this ideal, existed mainly in the past.
Dr. Charles D a v e n a n t 's criticism of the regime between 
1697 and 1702 provided the ideological basis for Tory 
opposition and for the continuation of the opposition 
alliance between urban republicans and country gentlemen. 
Davenant objected that the gentry bore the brunt of the
Oflfttaxation that subsidized the Bank and the national d e b t .
1X2
Davenant saw a conspiracy. The Whig war required extensive 
loans and debts, and these enlisted investors. The 
investors, in turn, became strong ministerial 
s u p p o r t e r s . 1 The Whigs grew richer and stronger, arid the
gentry absorbed the c o s t . Davenant thus connected war to 
commerce and envisaged both as a threat to gentry 
independence and virtue. The government was becoming 
corrupted, and the gentry were being deprived of the means 
to correct the disequilibrium. Further, he recognized the 
epistemological challenge that speculation presented.
Opinion and predictions regarding the future now seemed more 
appropriate grounds for knowledge than experience and 
tradition. This provided, Davenant believed, a very fragile 
basis for morality.292
The Whig regime in the eighteenth century was 
oligarchic, commercial, and imperial. It maintained a 
centralized system of one-party rule closely tied to the new 
world of finance. It drew its stability from the unity it
•\Q'l
forged between government and landed society. 0 
Theoretically, it envisaged itself as a Polybian mixed 
government, based upon a social order of independent landed 
gentlemen who sustained virtue. In reality, it required a 
spoils system of patronage and influence and practiced a 
dynamic politics that appealed to a doctrine of sovereignty 
rather than to a static b a l a n c e . 294 That is, its ideology 
contradicted its practice and provided its opposition with
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ready-made challenges. The Whig aristocrats insisted on the 
pragmatic need for patronage and strong government, but they 
floundered when challenged to defend themselves ethically. 
They claimed necessity, but they held up no adequate 
counter-foundation for a morally unified personality that 
could silence their critics.
The regime critics continued to include Tory gentlemen, 
such as Lords Bolingbroke and Lyttelton, Jonathan Swift, 
Alexander Pope, and John Gay, and radical commonwealthmen 
like John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon. John Toland, Walter 
Moyle, and Lord Molesworth. Eighteenth-century debates in 
England, then, did not represent an attack by an emerging 
bourgeoisie against an entrenched aristocracy. The 
aristocratic Whig regime was modern, progressive, and the 
defender of the new commercial forces. The opponents, on 
the other hand, used a past-oriented language. They 
resisted the new finance and conducted their attack in the 
name of "classical- republican and agrarian-military 
values. The squirearchy naturally resisted the erosion
of their political influence caused by the emergence of the 
new monied interest. The urban radicals from the middling 
ranks of society, however, presented more of a paradox in 
their opposition. These owners and traders of movable 
property adopted an ideological tradition that seemed to 
deny the validity of their aspirations. Their reformist 
ideology stressed the importance of landed wealth. They
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themselves were part of the market relations held up as the 
force corrupting government and society. However, it was 
this group that was most vulnerable to market fluctuations. 
They detested stockjobbers and speculators, and they 
accepted the available ideology that explained their 
insecurity and hard times by blaming financiers.296 The 
attack on the Whig aristocratic order was, at the same time, 
an attack on modern commercial society; the defenders of the 
regime were defenders of m o d e r n i t y . 292
Political thought thus proceeded in one of two 
directions in the half century following the Glorious 
Revolution. Governmental opposition, composed of gentry and 
urban radicals, looked to the past to defend virtue against 
modern innovations. They opposed, as corrupt, standing 
armies, patronage, and credit. Standing armies and 
patronage generated specialization and thus alienation. 
Credit, founded only upon opinion, generated uncertainty. 
Society no longer guaranteed virtue, and the governmental 
critics recommended individual frugality and restraint, the 
adoption of a militia, and the independence of the parts of 
the balanced constitution.298 Society required a perpetual 
renewal of independence. The opposition persistently 
demanded frequent parliaments and the elimination of 
placemen as mechanical devices to encourage such 
independence.
The defense of the regime required, then, a defense of
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modernity. This defense did not involve, however, a simple 
defense of commerce. Both the defenders and the critics of 
the new order accepted land as the basis of independent 
virtue. Both recognized that land itself had now become 
dependent on trade. Both identified the new monied interest 
as a financial, speculative interest, rather than as a 
merchant interest. The defenders as well as the critics 
viewed credit with at least suspicion, and all opposed 
stockjobbing. The critical division between governmental 
supporters and opponents was simply that between those who 
accepted credit as a necessary evil and those who did 
n o t . 299
Governmental defenders countered the charge that the 
new order destroyed citizenship with the claim that it 
eliminated the savage conditions of the pa s t . 299 They 
accepted the psychological implications of founding 
personality on credit. Human perception and motivation 
were, they admitted, based on opinion, passion, and 
interest.292 Therefore, in the first piace, the world was 
conventional and subjective. Experience, not a set of 
original principles, was the only guide. Change occurred 
inevitably and should be met p r a g m atically,"by operating 
upon human passions in the ways demanded by the m o m e n t . " 292 
Second, society therefore required: (1) strong government
to manage the volatile, fluctuating national resources, and 
(2) citizens, freely trained to deference and obedience.
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rather than Independent participation., because they lacked 
full rationality and v i r t u e . H o w e v e r ,  governmental 
defenders could not supply a counter-ethics to the classical 
ideal. Governmental critics insisted on value and virtue, 
while governmental supporters stubbornly insisted that 
change was progressive, that it lifted men out of barbarism 
and provided them with culture and learning. The paradigm 
for value remained, for all, civic m a n . 304 An alternative 
ethics, suitable to commercial man, eluded Augustan 
theorists. Men had to choose between virtue and culture, 
and their paradigm implied an inevitable loss however they 
c h o s e .
The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, writing 
between 1749 and 1754, voiced the extreme rejection of 
modernity. Commerce involved the pursuit of private gain 
and the indulgence of private appetites. Additionally, by 
unleashing human greed, it destabilized the social order. 
Commercial values disrupted the natural order of society, 
produced gross inequalities, divorced men from their natural 
virtues of simplicity, goodness, and compassion, made them 
acquisitive, vain, treacherous, and h y p o c r i t i c a l , and 
created artificial needs that enslaved men. Modern society 
produced only inequality, alienation and the loss of 
virtue .
Bernard Mandeville (The Fable of the B e e s , 1714) 
represented the other extreme of the debate. Mandeville
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embraced modernity and attempted to justify the defects 
critics found in commerce by arguing that they worked 
together for universal b e n e f i t . H e  began by noting that 
all prosperous, powerful, modern societies had been built 
upon corruption and upon appeals to the greedy nature and 
sensual appetites of men. Therefore, he reasoned, 
individual acquisitiveness and love of luxury must unleash 
the productive power of society. "Private vices" produced 
"publick benefits." However, Mandevilie's theory 
separated social and personal morality. Personal goodness 
remained problematic.
Eighteenth-century theorists, committed to the idea 
that society was progressing, strove to create a science of 
society, to identify the common evolutionary process 
experienced by all growing societies. French writers such 
as Helvetius, Turgot, and Francois Quesnay, and Scottish 
theorists like Adam Ferguson, Lord Kanes, John Millar, and 
Adam Smith, ultimately distinguished four stages of 
development in society. Under the stimulus of population 
growth, societies moved from hunting to shepherding to 
farming to, finally, t r a d i n g . This notion of productive 
progress was then used to provide a counter-ethics for 
commercial society. The four-stage theory of productive 
development was joined to a theory of manners and the 
progressive development of personality. As the modes of 
production advanced, the civilization of the passions
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progressed. Increasingly, men encountered things and 
persons. These encounters provoked passions that then were 
refined into m a n n e r s . 009 An increasingly sophisticated 
society moderated men's passions by converting them into 
opinion, experience, and interest. Thus, commercial society
01  Arefined the passions that motivated m e n . A  kind of 
commercial humanism was being advanced against the classical 
ideal. Personal social enrichment, arising from the complex 
relationships presented by commerce, more than compensated 
for any loss of antique virtue. Men, social by nature,
•31 1substituted social manners for political virtue. Now, 
the choice for a polite refinement over an uncouth virtue 
was not simply a choice of culture at the expense of virtue. 
Instead, culture civilized men by bringing them to an 
awareness of each other and thus enabling them to moderate 
their passions. Thus eighteenth-century theorists defined a 
morality in which virtue arose from society and commerce and
n 1 ■>
needed no civic expression. As morality became more 
private than public and participatory, the ideological basis 
for justifying a strong central authority over a static
31 3balance of orders was s t r e n g t h e n e d . 1
David Hume and Montesquieu summarized the eighteenth- 
century dilemma. The debate between commerce and virtue
1 Athen remained unaltered until the French Revolution.13 
Montesquieu argued that the decline of society, though 
inevitable, was remote. For contemporary observers.
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therefore, the intermediate perspective was more important
and, luckily, more appealing.315 Hume agreed. He worried
that, in a commercial society, no forces existed that might
check the advance of c o r r uption.31*’ But, like other
Scottish theorists, he was committed to the advantages
offered by trade and culture. He accepted the need for
patronage and a strong executive authority. The former
benefitted commerce and the latter disciplined human nature.
Yet he shared his age's fear of credit and empire and, in
the end, he could not reconcile liberty and culture.
Society would either die a violent death, torn by faction,
licentiousness, and anarchy, or an easier, more comfortable
317suicide under an absolute monarch. Neither Montesquieu 
nor Hume were entirely comfortable with every aspect of 
modernity. Both conceded that patronage and commerce 
subverted virtue. However, both believed that the 
inevitable crisis inherent in the progress of commercial 
society lay far in the future, that antique virtue was not a 
completely realizable goal, and that values adequate to the
TOOpresent had to suffice.
By the 1760s, the Whig regime had begun to splinter. 
Whig aristocrats who did not serve in the ministry adopted 
opposition rhetoric to attack office-holding Whigs. They 
called for a return to the ancient constitution and 
republican virtue and charged that the crown and ministry 
were attempting to destroy the -independent capacity of the
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OQQa r i s t o c r a c y / 7- Commonwealth and Tory opposition continued 
as well. A radical Lockeanism that asserted a popular right 
to alter government finally appeared, but the dominant 
debate remained that between ancient virtue and the 
historical development of liberty. Regime opponents still 
refused to accept the modern commercial world of the Whig 
r e g i m e .^
Josiah Tucker, a conservative defender of the Whig 
commercial regime in the 1760s and 1770s, was the first 
theorist to identify Lockean natural rights theory as
Qfllsubversive. Tucker linked the Lockean claims of natural
liberty to the insistence of religious Dissenters on the
freedom of individual c o n s c i e n c e N a t u r a l  rights theory
and a religion of reason that proposed to disestablish the
clergy both entailed a political culture based on dissent.
Each erred. Tucker believed, in assuming that the moral
personality was fully formed in some original s t a t e .^
And either philosophy would delegitimate the foundations of
a u t h o r i t y .^  Against Locke and the Dissenters, Tucker
opposed the traditional theory of natural law. Men were
naturally sociable, he claimed, and they learned to
recognize and accept their natural differences of rank and
'insauthority through their social experiences. A learned 
and natural deference characterized the relations of men 
rather than any radical, autonomous equality.
Tucker also espoused the common Whig defense of
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commercial society. He argued that commerce was a natural
in/
human activity compatible with submission to authority.-3110 
Commercial relations, and men's personalities based on those 
relations, improved over time. Liberty was modern, rather 
than original, and commercial relations constituted the 
precondition of the progressive development of personality. 
Commerce created increasingly complex relations. These 
relations refined the passions of men and thereby allowed 
men to discover and then voluntarily submit to the natural
q n?subordinations of s o c i e t y . T u c k e r ' s  argument thus 
defended the Whig order against both the Lockean natural 
rights doctrine and the republican vision of history.
Whether the opposition clamor for a reform of 
representation envisaged itself in terms of a Lockean right 
of reform or as a republican remedy for corruption, the Whig 
defense was, at once, a defense of commercial society and of 
aristocratic rule. Whether radicals bemoaned commerce 
because of a Lockean antipathy to aristocracy or a 
republican dread of overspecialization, all assumed that 
commerce and aristocracy were pieces of the same fabric. In 
the eighteenth century, men accepted: first, that commerce
preceded and formed the basis of modern culture and manners: 
and second, that commerce entailed the presence of an
d Afla r i s t o c r a c y .
Additionally, the paradigm of sovereignty slowly, 
imperceptibly continued to displace that of balanced
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government. The regime Whigs defended government by a 
strong execut ive-in-Par I iarnent in a society based upon rank 
and deference. This, of course, challenged any vision of a 
governmental balance of independent powers protected by
■3(10autonomous, active citizens. However, even the 
opposition had, unconsciously, begun to abandon the 
classical ideal. The demands for frequent parliaments and 
the elimination of placemen to protect autonomy were being 
enveloped within a generalized call for the reform of 
representation in Parliament. Representation involved a 
transfer of rights and powers inconsistent with classical 
citizenship; it implied a form of government based upon
iinsovere i g n t y . v
By 1784, the Whig regime had closed ranks against the 
opposition. They had begun to delineate firmly between 
those reforms they would tolerate and those they would not. 
Additionally, British radicalism had been tamed. The debate 
had settled into a struggle between an entrenched oligarchy 
and an opposition seeking to reform Parliamentary 
representation. This battle, though bitter, was essentially 
reformist rather than r a d i c a l . ^  Then, the French 
Revolution forced another alteration in the terms of the 
debate. Edmund Burke, seeking to defend the Whig 
aristocratic, commercial order, emerged as the engineer of 
that change.
The French Revolution confounded the British by seeming
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to present a choice between commerce and aristocracy.
Lockeans were the least challenged by the antagonistic
juxtaposition of commerce and a ranked society. Lockean
radicals like Richard Price viewed the Revolution, instead,
in terms of the right of revolution. Others tended, at
first, to view the Revolution as simply a struggle for
liberty against absolutism. Burke hesitated only a moment,
then attacked. He, of course, contested the right of
revolution. But, beyond this, he glimpsed the challenge
that the revolution presented to the Whig order of.commerce,
aristocracy, and cultivated manners. Whigs had assumed that
commerce refined men's passions and that learning and
culture flowed from commerce. Now they were confronted with
the spectacle in France of the systematic destruction by
cultivated intellects of the property and social relations
that had supposedly bred and nurtured them.312 Faced with
the choice between aristocracy and commerce. Burke opted to
change the paradigm. He reversed the Scottish school's
historical view of progress. Manners, Burke held, did not
emerge from commerce. Instead, commerce depended on
manners. Manners formed the basis of civilization.
Commerce could flourish only where polite manners protected
it. He wrote in R e f l e c t i o n s :
How much of that prosperous state [referring to 
Europe] was owing to the spirit of our old manners and 
opinions is not easy to say . . . .  Even commerce, and 
trade, and manufacture, the gods of our oeconomical 
politicians, are themselves perhaps but creatures; are 
themselves but effects, which, as first causes ,we
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choose to worship. They certainly grew under the same 
shade in which learning flourished. They too may decay 
with their natural protecting principles. “
And manners required, as their twin foundation-, both a
nobility and religion. The aristocratic and ecclesiastical
orders had furnished society with refinement, learning,
culture, manners, and taste. "Nothing is more certain." he
asserted,
than that our manners, our civilisation, and all the 
good things which are connected with manners and with 
civilisation, have in this European world of ours 
depended for ages upon two principles, and were indeed 
the result of both combined; I mean the. spirit of a 
gentleman, and the spirit of religion.
The French, by destroying the aristocratic and
ecclesiastical basis of manners, were leveling the
-Dllsfoundations of c i v i l i z a t i o n . J
Burke naturally inquired into the character of the 
revolutionary movement. He detected two revolutionary 
agents— the "men of letters" and the "monied interest."
"The monied men, merchants, principal tradesmen, and men of 
letters, (hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even 
timid part of society,) are the chief actors in the French 
R e v o l u t i o n . Burke appealed to the Whig disdain for
enthusiasm in his criticism of the men of letters. The 
Whigs had always shunned enthusiasm. Normally, enthusiasm 
referred to religious fanaticism, to the private capacity to 
understand God's will independent of the evaluation of 
others. It also carried, however, a secular connotation of 
speculation divorced from natural relations. Burke simply
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echoed Whig sentiment in favor of practicality when he
railed against the French "literary cabal's metaphysical
speculations divorced from normal bonds and relations.317
The "men of letters" had been deprived of patronage.
They had formed an alliance amongst themselves and embraced
an innovative philosophy that had no connection to or
0 1 0interest in the state. 0 These philosophers aimed
oi qessentially at the destruction of r e l i g i o n . ” In their 
reorganization of the state, these unpatronized philosophers 
ignored circumstances and heeded only their own imaginations 
and speculations. "It is remarkable." Burke wrote, "that in 
a great arrangement of mankind, not one reference whatsoever 
is to be found to any thing moral or any thing politic; 
nothing that relates to the concerns, the actions, the
QTf)passions, the interests of men."
The monied interest allied with the intelligentsia
because they shared their interest in attacking the French
church. The men of letters had an abstract hatred of
religion arising from their aversion to any schemes other
than their own. The monied interest wished to confiscate
church lands. The monied interest thus allied with the
men of letters as the latter justified their theft. The
monied and literary interests shared other bonds as well.
Burke referred to these bonds in 1791.
Views of ambition were in France, for the first time, 
presented to these classes of .men . . . .  A bribe, 
great without example in the history of the world, was 
held out to them— the whole government of a very large
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kingdom.322
Burke enlisted Whig support in his criticism of the men 
of letters; he tried to arouse opposition prejudices in his 
criticism of the monied interest. In his analysis of the 
villainous role of the monied interest. Burke appealed to 
the civic humanist language of England's country opposition. 
He raised the spectre of public debt and credit. The French 
investors, he maintained, had supported the revolution in 
order to promote favorable credit arrangements. The 
monied interest, like the literary cabal, sought to banish 
restraints with the revolution. Additionally, the monied 
interest, as well as the men of letters, divorced itself 
from any concrete connections or bonds and fed only upon its 
own imagination. The system of paper money circulation 
instituted in France by the monied interest instilled "the 
spirit of money-jobbing and speculation" into the "land 
itself . . . .  By this kind of operation, that species of
o 74property becomes (as it were) volatile."
Thus Burke, in his attack on the French Revolution, had 
appealed to the Whig disdain for excess in his critique of 
the men of letters, and he had mined the civic humanist fear 
of credit relations in his charges against the monied 
interest. He had changed the materialist paradigm that 
based culture on commerce, and he had enlisted both regime 
and opposition languages to do so.
Burke was not an aristocrat reacting against the rise
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of a bourgeois, commercial class. Burke was a Whig; he 
approved of commercial a c t i v i t y . 323 He feared the energy 
of the middle class, not its entrepreneurial activity. Men 
in France had disengaged themselves from any system of 
property relations. The property of France no longer
 ̂Agoverned it. Restraints of interest and dependency had
been dissolved. Nothing remained to discipline sensibility,
197to arrest flights of imagination. This class now
possessed the unbridled capacity to act. In France, Burke
wrote, there was "no longer any means of arresting a
principle in its course." 328 With the destruction of the
institutions meant to preserve chivalric honor and to teach
ecclesiastical piety, nothing bound these men to patronage
or aristocratic leadership. No clerical institutions
existed to teach morals and manners. No royal or
199aristocratic techniques of control remained. A polite
society no longer harnessed, refined, and channelled the raw
energy of the middle class. Its capacity for enthusiasm,
metaphysics, and fanaticism remained unaltered. Thus this
llficlass had become, predictably, wholly d e s t r u c t i v e .
Burke's attitude toward the French Revolution hardened 
over the next few years. He came to see the.alliance of the 
monied men and the men of letters as a conspiracy engineered 
by bureaucrats and p h i l o s ophers.331 These conspirators 
aimed at despotic state power through the dissolution of all 
the natural ties that bound men to one another. They meant
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to overturn the traditional system of civilized manners and 
replace it with an unnatural system of their d e v i c e . ^  
Originally, Burke had believed that the French destruction 
of manners and their institutional supports would wreck 
their commercial relations as w e l l . ^  But he had, on the 
other hand, insisted over and over again that the Revolution 
was completely new, that traditional explanations were 
worthless for predicting its course France was "a new
power of a new s p e c i e s . Burke consequently concluded
that commercial society might exist under a variety of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
Instead of antithesizing aristocratic and bourgeois 
society, Burke offered a vision of France as a totalitarian 
state, opposed to and at war with the liberal, commercial 
society of civilized Europe. Before Burke, the ideal of the 
armed, virtuous, independent citizen had seemed to 
contradict the image of commercial speculators who relied on 
opinion and fantasy. Burke, however, like most Englishmen, 
had never been entirely comfortable with the speculative 
side of c o m m e r c e . In the 1790s, he linked the dread 
spectre of the speculative financier, the "monied interest," 
to the armed republic. He identified France as, at once, a 
republic and a vehicle for the designs of men whose schemes 
had no ties to or checks in the natural, material world.
The republic, all believed, expanded through conquest. The 
monied interest was not so very different. It grew through
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confiscation. The monied interest, by confiscating church 
property, had destroyed its teachers. With no guide to 
instruct and refine it, the monied interest now aimed simply 
for state power. Allied with the intelligentsia, this 
interest destroyed the social relations among men and 
established, in their place, a new unnatural system of 
manners. It made men into armed warriors, destroyed their 
individual differences and complex relationships, and 
offered, in their place, a state that was "all in all."338 
As opposed to the civilized commercial culture that 
multiplied and satisfied needs, this revolutionary system 
reduced everything to the s t a t e . 33̂
Before Burke, men believed that commerce produced a 
rich, infinitely varied, complex and learned culture. Men 
associated commerce with alienation, but it was alienation 
from a barbaric, austere virtue. Then Burke stood this 
materialist assumption on its head. The French Revolution 
did not pose a choice between aristocratic and bourgeois 
society. Commerce might exist in either regime. Commerce 
could be either liberal and civilized as in England or 
totalitarian and barbaric as in France. Speculators could 
be dangerous, or their destructive capacity might be refined 
and limited. Polite culture certainly produced and advanced 
commercial prosperity and progress. But the French also 
possessed a state that advanced commercial interests. Their 
commercial society, however, was not civilized. The French
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ferociously Ignored or crushed individual variety in the 
name of the state. Commercial relations might be cold, 
calculated, and crass as well as refined and mannered.
Polite culture provided for productive progress, but a 
commercial society might or might not remain cultured.34®
The difference was simply the presence in England and the 
absence in France of religious and aristocratic orders 
capable of teaching and sustaining refined manners and 
taste. France lacked those orders. She had no polite 
society to harness the raw energy of the middle classes.
She had become an armed republic.
Burke insisted that society had to preserve its 
chivalric and ecclesiastical roots. This insistence 
represented a desire to maintain ties to the past, not a 
wish to return to it. Burke never exhibited a reactionary 
nostalgia. He argued that clerical and aristocratic 
institutions promoted progress, and he never envisaged them 
as any kind of bulwark against modernity. He resisted the 
destruction of traditional institutions precisely because 
such destruction constituted an attack on modern 
society.341- Thus Burke's traditionalism reinforced his 
Whiggism. Burke refused to relinquish societal ties with 
either the past or the future.
CONCLUSION
Burke used the languages available to political 
thinkers in the eighteenth century when he responded to 
events. Only through an examination of the historical 
context can Burke's use of and contribution to these 
languages be adequately understood.
Burke trusted inherited wisdom and denied that abstract 
reason had more value. This traditionalist outlook owed 
something to Natural Law theory, to a belief in divine 
guidance. It was also, however, founded in the common law 
habit of thinking prevalent in England for centuries. An 
understanding of the debate in England over the common law 
tradition isolates Burke's contribution to this area of 
political thought. It also reveals that Burke's 
traditionalism was not simply a reaction to political 
rational ism.
Common law was assumed to be based on immemorial 
custom. Custom was immemorial, however, in two senses. It 
was held to be both unchanging and ever-changing. The 
adaptive, ever-changing sense of custom had been suppressed 
by the eighteenth century. Immemorial had come to mean 
unchanging. The appeal to t h e .immemorial ancient 
constituion had become a reactionary call to return to an 
idealized past. Burke revived the adaptive sense of custom,
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and this single event in the centuries-long debate over 
common law explains Burke's mature traditionalism.
Against reactionary nostalgia, the progressive Whig 
regime had offered an empirical, pragmatic, presentist 
appeal. This empirical appeal was not, in practice, 
radically different from traditionalist appeals to 
precedent. Both appeals worked to authorize present 
arrangements. The Whig appeal, however, was insufficient to 
defend against the radical reformist appeals to nature and 
reason. To defend against these opponents, Burke simply 
revived the arguments of Chief Justice Hale. In the 
seventeenth century. Hale had countered the argument of the 
political rationalist, Thomas Hobbes, with arguments 
favoring reliance on adaptive custom. Experience, he 
argued, was a surer and steadier guide than reason. A 
century later, Burke found, appeals to adaptive custom still 
answered appeals to reason and nature. England possessed an 
ancient constitution that contained the inherited wisdom of 
many generations. With this constitution, England had 
progressed and improved, and this method of change was 
surely more reliable than and superior to individual 
abstract reasonings.
Burke's revival of adaptive custom allowed him to 
occupy a middle ground between the reactionary appeal to the 
past and the rationalist speculations for the future. He 
could defend present arrangements and admit prudential
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reform without having to ally himself with extremist visions 
about the past or the future.
Burke was more than simply a traditionalist. He also 
supported the progressive, commercial Whig regime. This 
apparent anomaly in Burke's political thought disappears 
when considered within its ideological context. To debate 
the merits of commercial society, eighteenth-century 
political thinkers employed a civic humanist language that 
appealed to classical notions of mixed government, 
citizenship, and virtue. Commercial society, in this 
ideological context, seemed to present the choice between a 
barbaric, but virtuous, pre-commercial past and a refined, 
but decadent, commercial present. The Whigs and Burke 
firmly supported commercial society and its institutions.
The French Revolution confused eighteenth-century 
analysts who believed that aristocracy and commerce were 
inseparably joined. The French seemed to offer the 
unpleasant choice between aristocracy and commerce. Burke 
refused to choose. Instead he shifted the ideological 
foundations that had dichotomized the two. Men had accepted 
that refined culture grew out of commercial relations.
Burke now argued that commercial relations were founded in a 
mannered society, and that such a mannered society required 
aristocratic and ecclesiastical institutions to sustain and 
nurture it. The French, by levelling ranked society, had 
destroyed the foundations of their prosperous civilization.
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They had eliminated all the accumulated restraints that made 
a refined, cultured life possible. Now they had exposed 
themselves to the dictates of naked, unrestrained power.
A few years later, Burke concluded that commerce was 
possible in either society. Barbarians as well as gentlemen 
might engage in commercial relations. Commerce, previously 
seen as the material foundation for the multiplication of 
complex and diverse relationships, might serve the state as 
well as the individual. In debasing their aristocratic and 
ecclesiastical institutions, the French destroyed, not their 
potential for commerce, but the possibility of a civilised 
life. The French, unrestrained by a nobility and untaught 
by a clergy, now busied themselves with the task of 
eliminating individual diversity. The state was "all in 
all."
Thus Burke rejected the model that would force a choice 
between aristocratic and bourgeois society. He was not 
simply an aristocratic apologist horrified at the threatened 
predominance of the middle classes. Instead, Burke argued, 
the choice offered to civilization was that between a 
liberal commerce that encouraged individual diversity and a 
totalitarian commerce that crushed individuality for the 
sake of a strong national state. What separated the two 
ways of life was the presence in English liberal society and 
the absence in the French state of the aristocratic and 
ecclesiastical institutions that cultivated and preserved
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manners and refined tastes. Thus Burke finally enlisted his 
traditionalism, his respect for inherited institutions, to 
defend Whig commercial society. His traditionalism 
represented neither a bulwark against modernity nor a 
rejection of commercial society. In fact, Burke believed 
that a traditional society, respectful and protective of its 
ranked institutions, provided the necessary foundation for a 
liberal, commercial society. In the end, Burke reconciled 
his traditionalism and his Whiggism.
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